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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 5, 1985, Helen Schartner was raped and mur-
dered on her way home from a bar in Virginia Beach.1 Joseph O'Dell
was at the same bar that night, and fellow patrons claim he left the
bar shortly after Schartner departed. 2 Several hours later, O'Dell
was seen entering a convenience store with blood on his hands,
face, and clothes. 3 O'Dell's estranged girlfriend-who had previ-
ously falsely accused O'Dell of other murders-read about Schart-
ner's murder and called the police to report that O'Dell had left
some bloody clothes in her garage.4 The police arrested O'Dell and
charged him with the rape and murder of Schartner. 5 He was tried,
found guilty, and sentenced to death. 6O'Dell's 1986 conviction rested primarily on the testimony of
a state forensic expert who claimed that the blood on O'Dell's shirt
and jacket was "consistent" with that of Schartner's. 7 Because DNA
1. Afraid of a Shadow of a Doubt, WASH. POST, May 7, 2000, at B8; Roger Parloff, Gone but
Not Forgotten, AM. LAW, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 5.
2. John C. Tucker, A Look at Executions; What's Wrong with Making Sure?, WASH. POST,
July 20, 1997, at C3 (noting that witnesses said that O'Dell and Shartner left within fifteen to
thirty minutes of one another).






2002] EXECUTING THE INNOCENT 955
testing was not widely available in the mid-eighties when O'Dell
was tried,8 the expert relied solely upon a rudimentary blood analy-
sis, which compared proteins and enzymes. 9
O'Dell consistently maintained his innocence, claiming that
on the night of the murder he had gotten into a fistfight after leav-
ing the bar, 10 and the blood on his clothing came from this fight,
rather than from any assault upon Schartner." DNA tests per-
formed on O'Dell's shirt in 1990-four years after his conviction-
proved that the blood on his shirt did not come from Schartner. 12
The tests were inconclusive with respect to the blood on O'Dell's
jacket. 13 While his case was on appeal, O'Dell gathered additional
evidence of his innocence. At trial, the state had presented the tes-
timony of Steven Watson, a jailhouse informant who claimed that
O'Dell confessed to Schartner's rape and murder while the two
shared a jail cell. 14 In 1996, Watson gave a statement under oath in
which he admitted that his trial testimony was false and that
O'Dell had, in fact, never confessed to him.15
In 1997, O'Dell requested that additional DNA tests be per-
formed on semen samples recovered from the victim. 16 Earlier at-
tempts to test this evidence had been unsuccessful; however, recent
advances in DNA technology now made it possible to perform DNA
testing on the small amount of genetic material in the sample.1 7
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Tucker, supra note 2 (explaining that other witnesses confirmed O'Dell's story that he
had gotten into a bar fight at another tavern that night).
11. Id.
12. Id. The test showed that the blood on O'Dell's shirt was neither the victim's blood nor
his own. Id. "That proof both undermined a major part of the state's case and supported O'Dell's
claim that the blood had come from an incident unconnected to the murder." Id.
13. See Petition for Appeal at 9 n.6, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Fruit (Va. 1999) (No. 99-
1834) [hereinafter Petition for Appeal]. On the basis of the test results, both a defense expert and
an expert for the Commonwealth concluded that DNA testing of the jacket sample was "inconclu-
sive." Id. An additional expert for the Commonwealth testified, however, that "by analyzing [the
private lab's] results under the Virginia state crime lab's 'match window'-which [is] 35% larger
than the match window [of the private lab]"-he was able to conclude that the blood on the jacket
was "consistent" with that of the victim. Id.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. Of all the wrongful convictions exposed through DNA testing by the Cardozo Law
School's Innocence Project, jailhouse snitches played an integral role in twenty-one of these
cases. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 156 (2000). Of the cases that the Innocence Project
investigated, none of the jailhouse snitches ever admitted to having fabricated their stories. See
id.
16. See Petition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 3.
17. Id. At the time of the earlier unsuccessful tests, the lab was using a method of DNA
testing called RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism), which requires a substantial
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These additional DNA tests, O'Dell argued, would provide him with
an opportunity to prove his innocence conclusively.18 The state at-
torney general, the governor, and the state and federal courts all
refused to permit the testing. 19 As a result, Joseph O'Dell was exe-
cuted on July 23, 1997.20
Convinced that O'Dell was wrongly executed, a team of law-
yers, religious leaders, and death penalty opponents sought access
to the body fluid evidence, so that DNA testing could finally be per-
formed. 21 It was too late to spare O'Dell's life, his advocates admit-
ted, 22 but not too late to expose the faulty system that had allowed
his execution. 23 The Roman Catholic Diocese of Richmond and the
Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center jointly filed suit in the Circuit
Court of the City of Virginia Beach asking the court to donate the
samples to them for testing.24 The Diocese's claim relied on both the
common law right of access to judicial records 25 and a Virginia stat-
ute that gives trial court judges discretion to donate evidence in
criminal cases to charitable organizations upon completion of all
proceedings. 26
The Commonwealth "vehemently opposed the petition" and
asked the court instead for permission to destroy the evidence. 27
The Commonwealth warned that if the test results showed O'Dell's
amount of DNA. Record of Hearing Before Circuit Court Judge Edward Hanson, Jr. (June 15,
1998) at 44-45, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Fruit (Va. Cir. Ct. of Virginia Beach 1998) (No. CL 98-
122) [hereinafter Record of Fruit Hearing]. An improved method of testing was subsequently
invented-the PCR (polymerase chain reaction) test-which enables the testing of much smaller
genetic samples. Id. at 45.
18. Afraid of a Shadow of a Doubt, supra note 1.
19. Petition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 3.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Petition for Donation of Certain Items Used as Evidence Against Joseph Roger O'Dell at
Trial, and Motion for Temporary Injunction at 1-2, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Fruit (Va. Cir. Ct.
of Virginia Beach 1998) (No. CL 98-122) [hereinafter Petition for Donation of Certain Items].
22. See id. at 4 (explaining that the plaintiffs do not "take issue with this Court's prior rul-
ings" and conceding that "Mr. O'Dell has been executed").
23. See id. (noting the public's interest in knowing whether an innocent person has been
executed).
24. Id. at 1-2.
25. See Petition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 4.
26. Id. The statute provides that "[u]pon petition of any organization which is exempt from
taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the court in its sound discretion may
order the donation of an exhibit to such charitable organization." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4(D)
(Michie 2000). Such donation may be made after the exhaustion of all appellate remedies. Id. §
19.2-270.4(A). The petitioning charities also argued that the First Amendment and the common
law right of access mandated public access to the evidence. See Petition for Appeal, supra note
13, at 4.
27. See Afraid of a Shadow of a Doubt, supra note 1; see also Petition for Appeal, supra note
13, at 1-2.
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innocence "it ... would be shouted from the rooftops that the Com-
monwealth of Virginia executed an innocent man."28 The Common-
wealth also questioned the integrity of the remaining physical evi-
dence, 29 arguing that the authorities had not maintained a proper
chain of custody over the evidence during its many years in stor-
age.3 0 In raising the possibility that someone might have tampered
with or inadvertently contaminated the sample, the Commonwealth
argued that any DNA testing would be unreliable. 31
The petitioners responded to the Commonwealth's argument
regarding the integrity of the evidence by explaining that the DNA
tests themselves would reveal any contamination of the sample. 32
The evidence consisted of vaginal swabs from the victim, which pre-
sumably contained the victim's DNA as well as that of her rapist. 33
If a third person's DNA were added to the swabs, the testing would
simply reveal the presence of a third DNA signature in addition to
the two DNA signatures-that of the victim and her rapist-
originally in the sample.34 Consequently, any attempt to tamper
with the sample by introducing a third person's DNA would be un-
successful for two reasons: (1) the rapist's DNA would remain a
part of the sample and would be identified by the DNA test, and (2)
the test would identify the presence of the third party's DNA, which
would raise suspicion of tampering since earlier DNA tests had
identified the presence of only two DNA signatures. On the other
hand, if the samples had been switched, the swabs would lack the
victim's DNA, which would also indicate tampering. 35 In either
case, the petitioners argued, the sophisticated DNA testing would
reveal any efforts to tamper with the sample.36
The Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach, exercising
its discretion under the statute governing disposal of evidence, 37
denied the petitioners' motion, asserting that "[t]here have been too
many irregularities in the evidence, in the handling of the evi-
dence."38 On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. 39 Upon
28. Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 82.
29. Id. at 82-83.
30. Id. at 80-83.
31. Id.





37. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4(D) (Michie 2001).
38. Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 91.
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receiving the approval of the state's highest court, the Common-
wealth of Virginia incinerated the evidence, ensuring that DNA
testing would never be performed to resolve the lingering doubts
about the guilt or innocence of Joseph O'Dell. 40
The case of Joseph O'Dell is one of a handful of cases na-
tionwide in which third parties have sought access to physical evi-
dence after the death or execution of a convicted perpetrator in an
effort to exonerate the deceased through DNA testing. In some
cases, death penalty opponents have spearheaded the campaign,
eager to demonstrate that America's capital punishment system
makes fatal mistakes. 41 In other cases, media organizations have
sought access to the information in an effort to assess the reliability
of questionable convictions. 42 And finally, in still other cases, sur-
viving family members of deceased perpetrators have sought to re-
store the name of their loved ones through posthumous exonera-
tion.43
Because there is no established legal avenue for gaining ac-
cess to physical evidence in a closed criminal case, plaintiffs have
relied on a variety of legal theories to compel a state to allow DNA
testing of physical evidence in its custody. Plaintiffs have argued
that the First Amendment and state freedom of information laws
39. Laurence Hammack, Ministry Asks Judge to Block Evidence from Being Mailed; Group
Says DNA Test Would Prove Executed Man Was Innocent, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
Sept. 19, 2000, at B1 (noting that "the Virginia Supreme Court ruled the Roman Catholic Diocese
of Richmond was not entitled to obtain [the sample] for its own DNA testing').
40. Afraid of a Shadow of a Doubt, supra note 1.
41. In the cases of Joseph O'Dell and Roger Coleman, nonprofit organizations working
against the death penalty were among the parties that brought suit to gain access to the evi-
dence. See id. (establishing that the Roman Catholic Diocese of Richmond petitioned for access to
the DNA evidence in the O'Dell case); see also Frank Green, Roger Keith Coleman Was Executed
in 1992 for the Rape and Murder of His Sister-In-Law; With Improved DNA Technology, the Story
and Questions About Coleman's Guilt Are Still Alive, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 24, 2000, at
Al (noting that Centurion Ministries was one of the parties petitioning for access to the DNA
evidence in Coleman's case).
42. In the cases of Roger Coleman and Wayne Felker, media organizations including the
Boston Globe and the Atlanta Journal and Constitution were among the parties bringing suit to
gain access to the evidence. See John Aloysius Farrell, Scientist Vows to Safeguard DNA in Vir-
ginia Murder Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2000, at Al; see also Rhonda Cook, DNA Evidence
Absent in 1981 Murder Case; Laboratory Analysis Fails to Prove Whether Felker Raped, Killed
College Student, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 25, 2000, at 1B (noting that the Atlanta Journal and
Constitution and three other news organizations won a court order to have the evidence tested).
43. In the case of Richard Wayne Jones, Jones's two sons are seeking to gain access to
physical evidence in order to exonerate their father, who was executed in August of 2000. Dan
Malone, DNA Test Clears Man After Death; Condemned Inmate's Case May Prompt More Re-
views, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 16, 2000, at lA.
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mandate public access to evidence in closed criminal cases. 44 Plain-
tiffs have also relied on local statutes that allow trial judges to do-
nate evidence to charity organizations after the completion of a
criminal case.45 In one case, plaintiffs sought to gain access to
physical evidence by filing suit against the parties that they be-
lieved were actually responsible for the crime. 46
Despite these efforts, plaintiffs have experienced limited
success in their pursuit of access to evidence for posthumous DNA
testing. A review of the small group of cases in which access has
been sought reveals that existing legal avenues have failed to pro-
vide reliable access. 47 Where access has been denied, as in the
O'Dell case, the American public has lost a rare opportunity to dis-
cover whether its system of capital punishment makes fatal mis-
takes. Deprived of the critical information that could be obtained
from posthumous DNA testing, both sides of the death penalty de-
bate have continued to argue about whether the American legal
system has in fact executed innocent people. 48 While death penalty
proponents continue to insist that no innocent person has been exe-
cuted since the current death penalty experiment began in 1976, 49
44. See Opinion Letter at 5, In re Globe Newspaper Co. ("The Boston Globe") Request for
DNA Testing and Release of Results, Law No. 211-00; Centurion Ministries, Inc. Petition for
Donation of Exhibits Pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-240(4)(D), Law No. 212-00; Wash. Post, Virgin-
ian-Pilot, and Media Operations, Inc., d/b/a Richmond Times-Dispatch Request for DNA Testing
and Release of Results, Law No. 239-00, at 9 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 31, 2001) [hereinafter Opinion
Letter] (opinion letter of Judge Keary R. Williams, denying access to media plaintiffs and noting
that the media plaintiffs had argued for access to the evidence under the Virginia Freedom of
Information Act); Petition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 4-8. Freedom of information laws guaran-
tee a public right of access to documents within the government's control. See, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-3704 (Michie 2001) (providing that "all public records shall be open to inspection and
copying by any citizens of the Commonwealth").
45. See generally Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits Pursuant to
Va. Code § 19.2-270.4D, In re Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits
Pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-270.4D (Va. Cir. Ct. Virginia Beach 2000) (No. 212-00) [hereinafter
Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits]; Petition for Appeal, supra note
13, at 12.
46. See Malone, supra note 43 (explaining that, in the Jones case, the sons of the executed
man were "trying to determine whether the evidence might implicate other suspects who [the
sons] could in turn sue for damages").
47. See Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 9; see also Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17,
at 91 (denying access to petitioning charities).
48. See, e.g., Robert V. Pambianco, .... Oh Yeah? Name One, WASH. POST, June 20, 2000, at
A23; see also Death Penalty Information Center, Executed Despite Doubts About Guilt, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocothers.html#executed (last visited Feb. 6, 2002) (summa-
rizing cases in which individuals have been executed despite doubts of their guilt).
49. See, e.g., Edward Cohn, Paul Cassell and the Goblet of Fire: A Conservative Professor's
Adventure in the Liberal Legal System, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 28, 2000, at 33, available at
http://www.prospect.org/print/vll/19/cohn-e.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). In 1972, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that existing death penalty statutes led to arbitrary sentencing and struck
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
death penalty abolitionists point to fortuitous death row exonera-
tions and argue that innocent people have certainly been executed
in recent history. 50 Meanwhile, the legacy of Joseph O'Dell-and
others executed amidst lingering doubts of their guilt-remains un-
certain.
This Note advocates the passage of statutes that specifically
provide for public access to physical evidence for DNA testing in
closed criminal cases. The proposed statutes will satisfy the public's
interest in assessing the reliability of convictions and death sen-
tences and will also accommodate the state's interest in ensuring
the continued integrity and accuracy in the testing of physical evi-
dence.
Part II of this Note will explore the legal theories upon
which plaintiffs have thus far relied in seeking post-execution ac-
cess to DNA evidence in a state's custody. Specifically, this Part
will review claims made under state freedom of information acts,
the common law right of access, the First Amendment, and statutes
that provide for the donation of evidence to charitable organiza-
tions. This Part will demonstrate that these existing avenues have
failed to provide reliable post-execution access to DNA evidence.
Part III will then discuss the policy concerns that justify mandating
public access to physical evidence for the purpose of conducting
post-execution DNA testing. Specifically, this Part will argue that
proof of a wrongful execution would foster a more honest and com-
plete public dialogue about the death penalty and would draw at-
tention to needed reforms in the criminal justice system. Finally,
Part IV will suggest that legislation be passed to facilitate posthu-
mous exoneration through DNA testing, and it will offer concrete
suggestions regarding the content of such legislation.
down these statutes as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. See Death Penalty In-
formation Center, History of the Death Penalty, Part I, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/history2.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). Then, in 1976, the
Court approved recrafted death penalty statutes, which were designed to avoid the problems of
arbitrariness. Id. The modern death penalty "experiment" thus began in 1976 with the passage
of these new statutes.
50. See, e.g., Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the Death Penalty: The Increasing Danger of
Executing the Innocent, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/inn.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002)
(noting the increasing risk of executing the innocent and explaining that many cases of innocence
have been discovered "not because of the normal appeals process, but rather as a result of new
scientific techniques, investigations by journalists, and the dedicated work of expert attorneys,
not available to the typical death row inmate").
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II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: THE INADEQUACY OF
. EXISTING LEGAL THEORIES
To date, there are only a handful of cases in which third par-
ties have sought access to physical evidence in closed criminal cases
for the purpose of conducting DNA testing.5' Overall, existing civil
avenues for obtaining access have proven to be inadequate. In some
cases, plaintiffs have relied on legal theories that afford judges
enormous discretion in determining whether to grant access to evi-
dence in the state's custody.5 2 In other cases, plaintiffs have crafted
creative legal arguments that simply do not adequately accommo-
date the unique situation raised by attempts at posthumous DNA
exoneration. 53
A. The Common Law Right of Access and State Open Records
Statutes
In several cases, third-party plaintiffs have relied upon state
freedom of information acts and/or the common law right of access
in seeking access to physical evidence in a closed criminal case. 54
The results in these cases demonstrate that the open records doc-
51. See In re Request for Inspection and Testing of Evidence in Connection with Criminal
Action No. 12405, No. 2000 V 67049, slip op. (Ga. Sup. Ct. Houston County July 28, 2000) (un-
published opinion of Judge L.A. McConnell, Jr.) (seeking evidence from Felker Case); Petition for
Equitable Bill of Discovery and Depositions Before Suit to Investigate Potential Claim or Suit
and Request for Injunctive Relief, In re Richard Wayne Jones, Jr. & Keith Donavan Jones (Tex.
Dist. Ct. Tarrant County 2000) (No. 048184376-00) [hereinafter Petition for Equitable Bill of
Discovery]; Request for DNA Testing and Release of Results, In re Globe Newspaper Co. ("The
Boston Globe") (Va. Cir. Ct. Buchanan County 2000) (No. 211-00) (seeking evidence from Cole-
man case); Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45 (seeking
evidence from Coleman case); Petition for Donation of Certain Items, supra note 21.
52. For example, in the Coleman case, the media plaintiffs sought access to the physical
evidence under Virginia's Freedom of Information Act, which gives the court unlimited discretion
over whether or not to grant access. See Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 9. The circuit court
exercised this discretion to deny access. Id.
53. The First Amendment, for example, has not provided a sufficient legal basis for access.
See infra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
54. In both the O'Dell and Coleman cases, the plaintiffs relied on the common law right of
access and/or on Virginia's open records statute. See Request for DNA Testing and Release of
Results, supra note 51, at 3; Petition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 4-8. In the Felker case, the
plaintiff news organizations relied on Georgia's Open Records Act. Memorandum in Support of
The Atlanta Journal Constitution's Motion to Intervene at 2, In re Request for Inspection and
Testing of Evidence in Connection with Criminal Action No. 12405 (Ga. Super. Ct. Houston
County 2000) (No. 2000 V 67049) [hereinafter AJC Motion to Intervene].
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trine55 does not offer third-party plaintiffs any meaningful guaran-
tee of gaining access to physical evidence in a state's custody.
1. Background
The common law right of access to court proceedings and re-
cords predates the Constitution.5 6 In England, access was generally
conditioned upon the petitioning party demonstrating a personal
interest in the records. 57 In the United States, access is generally
not conditioned upon a demonstration of either proprietary interest
in the document or a need for access to the document as evidence in
a lawsuit.58 Instead, the public's interest in keeping "a watchful eye
on the workings of public agencies" has been deemed a sufficient
interest to justify access. 59
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the Supreme
Court clarified that the common law right to inspect and copy judi-
cial records is not absolute. 60 Explaining that every court has su-
pervisory power over its own records and files, the Court concluded,
"[T]he decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant
facts and circumstances of the particular case."61 The Court noted
the scarcity of case law identifying legitimate factors that a trial
court should consider when it exercises its discretion, but it de-
clined "to delineate precisely the contours of the common-law
right .... 62
Lower courts have considered petitions to gain access to a
variety of court documents and pieces of evidence. 63 Under the
55. The term "open records doctrine," as used here, refers to both the common law right of
access and state statutory provisions-freedom of information acts-that mandate public access
to government records.
56. Diane Apa, Common Law Right of Public Access-The Third Circuit Limits Its Expan-
sive Approach to the Common Law Right of Public Access to Judicial Records, 39 VILL. L. REV.
981, 981-82 (1994).
57. Benjamin L. Sells, Note, The Right of Access to Judicial Records: When May the Elec-
tronic Media Copy Audio and Videotape Evidence?, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 755, 757-58 (1984); see
also Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334-39 (N.J. 1879).
58. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
59. Id. at 598. The Supreme Court also noted in Nixon that "a newspaper publisher's inten-
tion to publish information concerning the operation of government" is an interest sufficient to
compel access. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 599.
62. Id. at 598-99.
63. See, e.g., San Jose Mercury News v. United States Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101-02
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the public has prejudgment right of access to judicial records in civil
cases); United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that there is
[Vol. 55:953
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common law right of access, the media have been successful in ob-
taining access to documents, audiotapes, and videotapes that have
been admitted into evidence. 64 A review of existing case law, how-
ever, reveals that court-ordered access has generally occurred only
in cases where the material could be copied or easily inspected. 65 As
the Second Circuit explained in In re NBC ("Meyers"), only the
"most compelling circumstances" could justify restricting the public
right to access "[w]hen physical evidence is in a form that permits
inspection and copying without any significant risk of impairing the
integrity of the evidence or interfering with the orderly conduct of
the trial. '66 Under this standard, a court could easily exercise its
discretion to deny access to a biological sample of evidence, conclud-
ing that access would pose a significant risk to the continued integ-
rity of such evidence.
In many states, the common law right of access to judicial
records has been recognized or modified by statute. 67 The Virginia
Code, for example, provides, "The records and papers of every cir-
cuit court shall be open to inspection by any person and the clerk
shall, when required, furnish copies thereof, except in cases in
which it is otherwise specifically provided. '68 In construing this
statute, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the state legis-
lature intended to recognize the common law right of access while
also declaring its own power to make statutory exceptions to the
rule.69
There are few cases that have considered whether items of
physical evidence in criminal cases fall under the purview of free-
dom of information statutes. In Sideri v. Office of the District Attor-
ney, the New York Supreme Court concluded that evidence consist-
ing of "articles of clothing and alleged weapons" did not fall within
the statutory definition of a "record" under New York's freedom of
no common law right of access to administrative documents); In re NBC, 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d
Cir. 1980) (recognizing a common law right of the public and the press to copy ABSCAM video
and audiotapes admitted into evidence).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981) (recognizing common
law presumption of a right to inspect and copy videotapes admitted into evidence); NBC, 635
F.2d at 952 (recognizing a common law presumption of a right of the public and press to copy
ABSCAM video and audio tapes admitted into evidence).
65. See DAN PAUL ET AL., COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2000, at 212-15 (2000) (providing catalog of
case law granting access to documentary material, audiotapes, and videotapes-all materials
that can be easily copied or inspected).
66. 635 F.2d at 952 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597 n.7; 37A AM. JUR. 2D Freedom of Information Acts § 2, at 29
(1994).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-208 (Michie 1999).
69. Shenandoah Publ'g House, Inc. v. Fanning, 368 S.E.2d 253, 255 (Va. 1988).
2002]
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information law. 70 Some state statutes specifically address the
question of public access to physical evidence in criminal proceed-
ings. In Georgia, for example, a state statute provides that a trial
judge may exercise his or her discretion in deciding whether to al-
low public inspection of exhibits of evidence in criminal and civil
trials; however, where such direct access is denied, the custodian
must provide either a photograph, photocopy, facsimile, or other
reproduction. 71 Similarly, Virginia's Freedom of Information Act
provides that criminal evidence is excluded from the general man-
date requiring access to public records. 72 Instead, when one makes a
request for access to criminal evidence, such evidence "may be dis-
closed by the custodian, in his discretion.173
2. A Virginia Case: Roger Keith Coleman
In a case similar to the O'Dell suit, several newspapers and a
charitable organization, citing Virginia's Freedom of Information
Act, sought access to physical evidence in the case of Roger Cole-
man.74 Despite significant differences in the Coleman and O'Dell
petitions, 75 in both cases, the trial courts exercised their discretion
under the state statute and denied access to the physical evidence. 76
Virginia's 1992 execution of Roger Keith Coleman generated
significant controversy. 77 Coleman was sentenced to death in 1981
for the rape and murder of his sister-in-law, Wanda McCoy. 78 While
Coleman was on death row, Centurion Ministries, a nonprofit or-
ganization dedicated to exposing cases of wrongful convictions, in-
vestigated Coleman's case and became convinced that he was inno-
70. 663 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
71. See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-71.1 (1998) ("[A]n exhibit tendered to the court as evidence
in a criminal or civil trial shall not be open to public inspection without approval of the judge
assigned to the case .... ").
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3706 (Michie 2001).
73. Id.
74. See Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 3-4;
Request for DNA Testing and Release of Results, supra note 51, at 3.
75. See Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 8-9.
76. See Virginia v. Coleman, Nos. 106-81 & 108-81, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Buchanan
County Sept. 7, 2000) (unpublished court order); Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 91.
77. See John Aloysius Farrell, Judge Asked to Save DNA in Capital Case, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 14, 2000, at A5 ("The Coleman case is cited by the American Civil Liberties Union and
other foes of capital punishment as a wrongful execution. He appeared on the cover of Time
magazine before he died, and a book, 'May God Have Mercy,' has been written about the case.").
78. Id.
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cent. 79 In the months before Coleman's execution, the case received
national media attention, including a Time magazine cover story
that questioned Coleman's guilt.8 0
Coleman's supporters gathered significant evidence that in-
dicated his innocence;8' however, unsophisticated DNA tests per-
formed in 1990 failed to provide conclusive results regarding Cole-
man's guilt.8 2 Despite a vigorous campaign to spare his life, then-
Governor Douglas Wilder rejected Coleman's plea for clemency, and
Coleman was executed on May 20, 1992.83
In 2000, eight years after Coleman's execution, The Boston
Globe and Centurion Ministries sought access to the remaining
physical evidence in the Coleman case, in order to perform more
sophisticated DNA tests to determine whether or not Coleman was
79. JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
119-38 (1997) (describing the investigation by Centurion Ministries).
80. See Jill Smolowe, Must This Man Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40.
81. Coleman's lawyers were able to undermine the testimony of the jailhouse informant who
had testified at trial that Coleman had confessed to his involvement in the crime while the two
were in the county jail. TUCKER, supra note 79, at 185-87. Specifically, Coleman's investigators
established that this informant obtained leniency in exchange for his testimony against Coleman
and that he had admitted to others that his testimony was false. Id. Additionally, the investiga-
tors uncovered evidence that the victim's next-door neighbor, a man with a history of sexually
assaulting women, admitted to several people that he was the real killer. Id. at 247-48. The
investigators also demonstrated that at least two persons were involved in the crime, while the
undisputed testimony of various trial witnesses had established that Coleman was alone for the
entire evening. Id. at 247. The investigators also attacked the State's timeline and assembled
evidence that Coleman did not have time to commit the crime. Id.
82. The lab that conducted the tests concluded that the sperm taken from the victim's body
matched the DNA of Coleman and approximately two percent of the population. Id. at 179. The
tests also indicated that there were two sperm donors. Id. at 179-180. Coleman's lawyers insisted
that this evidence of a second perpetrator constituted additional evidence of Coleman's inno-
cence. Id. at 180. The lawyers explained that according to the Commonwealth's own timeline,
Coleman was alone at every stage of the evening and would not have had time to meet up with
an accomplice before committing the crime. Id. Moreover, Coleman's lawyers argued that the
reliability of the lab's inclusion of Coleman within the two percent of the population who could
have committed the crime was questionable. Id. at 180-81. With two sperm donors, it can be
technologically difficult to separate out the two strains of DNA, which can lead to inaccurate
results. Id. at 181. Although the Commonwealth could have argued that the victim's husband
must have been the second sperm donor, this was a problematic theory because the husband had
insisted that he and his wife had not had intercourse in the several days preceding her murder.
Id. at 180.
83. The day before the scheduled execution, then-Governor Wilder indicated that if Cole-
man took a lie detector test, he might reconsider his decision not to grant clemency. Id. at 280-
81, 295-97. While Coleman's supporters did not believe that he could pass a lie detector test
while experiencing the incredible stress of being within hours of his scheduled execution, they
nonetheless agreed to the test, knowing that nothing else could possibly save Coleman's life. Id.
at 306-307. On the morning of Coleman's scheduled execution, the lie detector test was adminis-
tered, and the Commonwealth's examiner concluded that Coleman failed the test. Id. at 312.
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actually guilty.8 4 The remaining physical evidence was in the cus-
tody of the private California laboratory that had conducted the
DNA tests in 1990.85 When the Commonwealth of Virginia learned
of the efforts to have this remaining evidence tested, the Common-
wealth's attorney general petitioned the Circuit Court of Buchanan
County in order to compel the California lab to return the Coleman
evidence to the state.8 6
In opposition to the Commonwealth's petition, lawyers for
The Boston Globe and Centurion Ministries argued that the com-
mon law right of access and Virginia's Freedom of Information Act
mandated that the public be allowed to test the remaining evi-
dence.8 7 While recognizing that the Virginia Supreme Court had
denied a similar petition in the O'Dell case, Centurion Ministries
emphasized distinct factors in Coleman that weighed in favor of
dismissing the Commonwealth's petition.88 In O'Dell, the trial court
had refused to grant access to the evidence based on the question-
able integrity of the remaining physical sample.8 9 The plaintiffs in
Coleman distinguished the O'Dell case, explaining that there was
no concern regarding the integrity of the remaining portion of the
Coleman rape kit.90 The kit had been in Virginia's exclusive custody
until it was sent to a reputable private laboratory in California for
DNA testing in 1990,91 and since that date, the sample had been
properly stored in a freezer at the California lab.92 Additionally,
unlike in the O'Dell case, there were no allegations that Coleman's
advocates had previously withheld unfavorable DNA results from
the Commonwealth. 93
Despite these factors, which rendered the Coleman petition
starkly distinguishable from the one in O'Dell, Circuit Court Judge
Keary Williams ordered the California lab to relinquish the remain-
84. Farrell, supra note 77; see also Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Ex-
hibits, supra note 45, at 5.
85. Farrell, supra note 77.
86. Id.
87. Id.; Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 2-4.
88. See Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration and for Hearing at 3, In re Petition of Cen-
turion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits Pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-270.4.D (Va. Cir. Ct.




91. Id. at 2 (explaining that, at the time of the petition in September 2000, the DNA evi-
dence had been in the custody of Dr. Edward T. Blake "for a decade").
92. Id.
93. See Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 9;
Petition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 8-9.
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ing evidence to the Commonwealth of Virginia. 94 The plaintiffs sub-
sequently petitioned for a rehearing.95
In May 2001, Judge Williams reaffirmed his decision man-
dating the return of the evidence to the Commonwealth of Virginia,
but stayed the order pending appeal. 96 Judge Williams looked to the
language of Virginia's Freedom of Information Act,97 which pro-
vides: "[c]omplaints, memoranda, correspondence and evidence re-
lating to a criminal investigation or prosecution" are excluded from
the Act's mandatory access provisions. 98 Although the court is not
required to grant access to criminal evidence under the act, the
statute does permit judges, in their discretion, to disclose such evi-
dence. 99 Exercising this discretion, Judge Williams found that there
was not a sufficient public interest to justify granting access to the
evidence.100 As Judge Williams explained, additional DNA tests in
the Coleman case "would have no bearing on the fairness of the
death penalty as it is now administered or on the public confidence
of the criminal justice system." 10 1 Pointing to changes in Virginia's
capital punishment system since Coleman's 1992 execution, includ-
ing advances in DNA technology and the recognition of defendants'
rights to use DNA in challenging convictions, Judge Williams as-
serted that the risk of error in Coleman's 1992 execution had little
relevance to the reliability of the current system. 10 2
94. Virginia v. Coleman, Nos. 106-81 & 108-81, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Buchanan County
Sept. 7, 2000) (unpublished court order).
95. Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration and for Hearing, supra note 88, at 1-4. In re-
sponse to Judge Williams's order, the director of the California lab, Edward Blake, insisted, "I'm
not sending [the sample] anywhere. It's my work product." Farrell, supra note 42.
96. Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 9; Laurence Hammack, No DNA Test for Executed
Prisoner; Genetic Tests Unavailable When Coleman Convicted, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
June 2, 2001, at Al.
97. Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 9.
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3706(F)(1) (Michie 2001).
99. Id. § 2.2-3706(F). Specifically, the Virginia Freedom of Information Act provides that
criminal evidence "may be disclosed by the custodian, in his discretion." Id. In effect, this lan-
guage gives the court, as custodian of the evidence, the discretion to allow or disallow access. See,
e.g., Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 9 (noting that "the VFOIA is not a mandate on the Court
to allow access to criminal evidence, but gives the Court, as custodian of the evidence, the discre-
tion to do so").
100. Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 7-8.
101. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
102. Id. Williams explained, "How can investigation of the death penalty as it was imple-
mented in 1992 be beneficial in scrutinizing the death penalty as it is carried out in 2001 when
the processes are so different?" Id.
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3. A Georgia Case: Ellis Wayne Felker
A similar case in Georgia yielded very different results. In
July 2000, several media organizations filed motions in the Supe-
rior Court of Houston County, requesting that they be allowed to
test physical evidence in the case of Ellis Wayne Felker. 10 3 Felker
was executed in Georgia's electric chair in 1996 for the rape and
murder of Evelyn Joy Ludlam, a nineteen-year-old college stu-
dent.104
Felker's conviction was based on circumstantial evidence,
and, throughout the case, he steadfastly professed his innocence. 10 5
Felker met the victim, Ludlam, at a bar where they discussed her
potential employment at his leather shop. 10 6 The following day-the
day of Ludlam's disappearance-the victim came by Felker's house
twice and his leather shop once. 10 7 Two weeks after her disappear-
ance, Ludlam's body was found in a creek. 08 She had been beaten,
raped, and strangled.'0 9 In 1983, Felker was convicted of the rape
and murder. 110 Prosecutors convinced a jury to find Felker guilty
based on evidence that: (1) Felker was the last person seen with the
victim; (2) hairs found on the victim's clothes were similar to
Felker's; (3) fibers on the victim's coat and from a blanket showed
that she had been in Felker's house; and (4) the attack was similar
to a sexual assault for which Felker had been convicted in 1976.111
103. See AJC Motion to Intervene, supra note 54, at 1; Motion of CBS Broadcasting, Inc. to
Intervene for the Purpose of Testing Evidence at 3, In re Request for Inspection and Testing of
Evidence in Connection with Criminal Action No. 12405 (Ga. Super. Ct. Houston County July 17,
2000) (No. 2000-V-67049); Request for Inspection and Testing of Evidence in Connection with
Criminal Action No. 12405 at 1, In re Request for Inspection and Testing of Evidence in Connec-
tion with Criminal Action No. 12405 (Ga. Super. Ct. Houston County July 13, 2000) (No. 2000-V-
67049) [hereinafter Request for Inspection] (concerning the Boston Globe's request for access to
the physical evidence in the Felker case).
104. Rhonda Cook, DNA Testing Ordered in Felker Case; Suspect Executed for Murder Four
Years Ago, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 26, 2000, at 1A; David E. Rovella, In Search of a Death
Penalty Martyr, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, at Al.
105. Rhonda Cook, DNA Testing Ordered in Case of Man Already Executed, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., July 27, 2000, at 1B (explaining that prosecutors admitted that their case against Felker
was circumstantial); Rovella, supra note 104 ("[Felker] had steadfastly professed his innocence
until the end, telling his executioners that they were killing an innocent man.").
106. Cook, supra note 104.
107. Id.
108. Rovella, supra note 104.
109. Id.
110. Cook, supra note 104 (noting that Felker was tried "17 years ago"); Rovella, supra note
104 (noting that Felker was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of Lud-
lam).
111. Cook, supra note 104.
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Felker admitted to having contact with Ludlum shortly be-
fore her disappearance. 112 He insisted, however, that he was not
responsible for her death and that the last time he saw her was
when she left his shop. 1 3 Felker remained on death row for thirteen
years.' 14 In the final months before his execution, his attorneys
sought the courts' permission to conduct DNA testing on the physi-
cal evidence, including the multiple hairs found on the victim's
body." 5 The courts refused to allow the testing." 6
Almost four years after the execution, The Boston Globe,
CBS News, The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, and several
other media outlets initiated an effort to obtain access to the physi-
cal evidence in the case in an attempt to conduct DNA testing that
could possibly exonerate Felker. 117 The newspapers and television
network petitioned the Circuit Court of Houston County, arguing
before the same judge that had signed Felker's death warrant sev-
eral years earlier."18 The petition relied on Georgia's open records
act, 19 which gives trial courts discretion to allow public inspection
of evidence in criminal trials.' 20
In making its determination, the court looked first to the
language of the statute: "[A]n exhibit tendered to the court as evi-
dence in a criminal or civil trial shall not be open to public inspec-
tion without approval of the judge assigned to the case.' 2' Exercis-
ing the discretion provided under the statute, the court determined
that access should be granted unless there was a compelling privacy
right that outweighed the public's "right to know."' 22 Upon engaging





116. Id. ("The courts refused, saying the request should have been made sooner. The courts
allow for such last-minute requests only when there is a new law that has not been reviewed by
the federal courts or new evidence that had not been available sooner."). Courts often find that
DNA does not constitute "newly discovered evidence" that would justify a deviation from the
procedural limitations in the capital appeals process. See Penny J. White, Newly Available, Not
Newly Discovered, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 7, 11-13 (2000). Such courts reason that the physi-
cal evidence was available at trial, and therefore, is not "new," even though the method of scien-
tifically testing the underlying evidence was not available at the time of trial. Id.
117. Request for Inspection, supra note 103, at 1.
118. Rovella, supra note 104.
119. Request for Inspection, supra note 103, at 1.
120. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-71.1 (1998).
121. In re Request for Inspection and Testing of Evidence in Connection with Criminal Ac-
tion 12405, slip op. at 1 (Ga. Super. Ct. Houston County July 28, 2000) (No. 2000 V. 67049) (un-




against granting access, including possible objections by the family
of the victim or the offender, simply did not outweigh the public's
"right to know."1 23 In defining the scope of the inspection granted
under the statute, the court explained that the public's right to ac-
cess the evidence would be rendered "hollow" if it were limited to a
visual inspection. 124 "In order for the inspection to be meaningful,"
the court explained, "the public should have a right to know what, if
anything, is contained in the subject evidence." 125 The court then
ordered that the hair samples and other physical evidence be made
available for DNA testing by a laboratory acceptable to the district
attorney. 126
Although the physical samples were sent to an independent
laboratory for testing, at present, the lab has been unable to reach
any conclusions regarding Felker's culpability. 127 Because the Geor-
gia state crime lab had not properly labeled the hair samples, the
independent laboratory has been unable to achieve its goal of de-
termining whether the hair samples found on the victim were in
fact Felker's. 128 Testing of the rape kit and fingernail scrapings
have been similarly unsuccessful. 29
4. A Viable Theory for Obtaining Access to Physical Evidence?
The right of access, as embodied in either the common law or
state statutory provisions, fails to provide sufficient access to physi-
cal evidence for those attempting to achieve posthumous exonera-
tion. The primary shortcoming of this theory is the large amount of
discretion that is granted to trial judges. A review of the three cases
examined-O'Dell, Coleman, and Felker-reveals that the extensive
discretion afforded to trial judges serves as a barrier to third par-
ties who have a legitimate interest in gaining access.
The Virginia Freedom of Information Act specifically ex-
cludes criminal evidence from the Act's mandatory disclosure provi-
sions.' 30 Instead, the act merely provides that such evidence "may
123. Id. at 1-2.
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Rhonda Cook, Crime Lab Blasted in Felker Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 27, 2000, at
lB.
128. Id.
129. See Cook, supra note 41 (explaining that the DNA could not be found in biological evi-
dence collected from the victim and that the lab did not expect to find DNA material under vic-
tim's fingernails).
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3706(F)(1) (Michie 2001).
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be disclosed by the custodian, in his discretion," and declines to of-
fer specific constraints on the custodian's exercise of this discre-
tion.131
The Georgia statute governing the inspection of public re-
cords is similarly limited. 132 The Georgia statute provides: "[An
exhibit tendered to the court as evidence in a criminal or civil trial
shall not be open to public inspection without approval of the judge
assigned .... ,,133 If inspection is not approved, the custodian of the
exhibit must provide a photograph, photocopy, facsimile, or other
reproduction of the exhibit. 134 Like the Virginia act, this Georgia
statute affords enormous discretion to the judge in deciding
whether or not to allow inspection of the exhibit. 135 The require-
ment that some reproduction of the exhibit be supplied if inspection
is denied does not seem to contemplate a request to subject the ex-
hibit to independent scientific testing.136 Although this Georgia
statute was interpreted to support access to the physical evidence
in the Felker case, the court's action in granting access to allow
DNA testing was premised on a very liberal construction of the
statute.137 Specifically, Judge McConnell found that the "inspection"
allowed under the statute entailed more than mere visual inspec-
tion of the evidence, but required his approval of DNA testing.138
The position taken by state officials in possession of the evi-
dence likely plays an influential role in the court's exercise of its
discretion. In the Coleman and O'Dell cases, the Commonwealth of
Virginia vehemently opposed granting access. 3 9 In contrast, the
Georgia officials in the Felker case agreed to provide access, seek-
ing only to control the terms under which the DNA testing would be
performed. 140 Thus, in instances in which state officials are opposed
131. Id. § 2.2-3706(F).
132. See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-71.1 (1998).
133. Id. § 50-18-71.1(a).
134. Id. § 50-18-71.1(b).
135. See id. § 50-18-71.1(a).
136. The types of reproductions that the act specifically suggests are very nonintrusive and
do not seem to suggest the possibility of permanently parting with a portion of the evidence. See
id. § 50-18.71.1(b).
137. See In re Request for Inspection and Testing of Evidence in Connection with Criminal
Action 12405, slip op. at 2 (Ga. Super. Ct. Houston County July 28, 2000) (No. 2000 V. 67049)
(unpublished opinion of Judge L.A. McConnell, Jr.).
138. See id.
139. See Afraid of a Shadow of a Doubt, supra note 1 (explaining that the Commonwealth of
Virginia vehemently opposed access to the DNA evidence in the O'Dell case); Farrell, supra note
77 (explaining that the Virginia Attorney General's office moved to block the testing and regain
control of the DNA samples in the Coleman case).
140. Telephone Interview with Charles W. Byrd, Attorney for Boston Globe (Oct. 2000) [here-
inafter Interview with Byrd].
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to granting access to physical evidence, it appears that the courts
are more likely to deny access.
The potential damage to public confidence in the judiciary is
another factor that likely plays a part in how the courts exercise
their discretion. In the O'Dell, Coleman, and Felker cases, the peti-
tions for access were argued before the same courts, and in some
instances the same judges, who had conducted the executed man's
original trial and heard his subsequent appeals.' 4' Allowing for the
testing of evidence that could ultimately prove that an innocent
man was executed under the watch of these courts would therefore
directly condemn their competence.
Arguably, the more the judiciary's reputation is at risk, the
more likely it is that a court will exercise its discretion to deny ac-
cess to evidence. For example, in the Felker case, the risk of se-
verely discrediting the judiciary was minimal because the DNA
tests were unlikely to exonerate Felker conclusively. 142 In contrast,
DNA testing of the evidence in both the O'Dell and Coleman cases
had the potential of completely exonerating these defendants, and
consequently, of proving that the Commonwealth of Virginia had
executed innocent men.' 43 As a result, DNA testing of the Coleman
and O'Dell evidence could be extremely inflammatory and could
dramatically undermine public confidence in the state's court sys-
tem. It is not surprising, therefore, that the O'Dell and Coleman
courts, unlike the Felker court, denied access to the physical evi-
dence. The judges in these two Virginia cases issued rulings that
directly protect the reputation of the judiciary, of which they are
sitting members. In O'Dell, the lawyers for the Commonwealth
clearly exploited this vulnerability by reminding the court that if
the DNA evidence exonerated O'Dell, it "would be shouted from the
141. See Rovella, supra note 104 (explaining that The Boston Globe's petition was filed before
Judge McConnell, the same judge that had signed Felker's death warrant); see also Record of
Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 62-63 (noting that the Roman Catholic Diocese petitioned for
posthumous access to the DNA evidence before the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach, the same
jurisdiction where O'Dell was tried and sentenced to death).
142. The primary evidence being tested in the Felker case consisted of hair samples and
fingernail scrapings. Rovella, supra note 104. Although a rape kit was taken from the victim, the
state crime lab had already concluded that no sperm was present in the samples taken. Cook,
supra note 129. While exclusion of Felker as the contributor of the hair sample evidence would be
highly suggestive of innocence, it would not conclusively establish his innocence. Rovella, supra
note 104 (noting that both Felker's former lawyers and the state prosecutor did not believe that
Felker would be posthumously vindicated).
143. In both the O'Dell and Coleman cases, rape kits were available for testing. Petition of
Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 2; Petition for Appeal,
supra note 13, at 3. Clearly, ruling out either man as the contributor of the semen in the rape kit
would conclusively establish his innocence.
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rooftops that the Commonwealth of Virginia executed an innocent
man."
44
B. The First Amendment: Freedom of the Press
In addition to claiming a common law right or statutory pub-
lic right of access to evidence, the media plaintiff in the Coleman
suit also argued for access under the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. 145 The Virginia circuit court refused to recognize a
media right to access physical evidence in closed criminal cases un-
der the First Amendment. 146 The Coleman case illustrates that
plaintiffs seeking post-execution access to DNA evidence will have a
difficult time satisfying the current test for determining access un-
der the First Amendment.
1. Background
The First Amendment protects not only freedom of speech,
but also freedom of the press. 147 In struggling to define the meaning
of "freedom of the press," the Supreme Court has considered
whether the First Amendment guarantees a right merely to publish
the news, or also to gather the news. 148 More specifically, the Court,
on numerous occasions, has considered whether the press enjoys a
constitutional right of access to places or information within the
government's control. 149
Claims of a special press right of access under the First
Amendment have generally not fared well.150 When the public itself
does not have access to certain places or information within the
government's control, the press enjoys no special right of access. 15'
Specifically, the Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test in
considering whether the press should be afforded access to govern-
144. Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 82.
145. Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 5.
146. See id. at 5-8.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
148. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 461-76 (1999).
149. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 419-431
(1999) (outlining cases in which the Supreme Court has considered whether the press has a
constitutional right of access to jails and judicial proceedings).
150. See id. at 419.
151. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (explaining that the govern-




ment-controlled places or information. 152 Under this test, the press
will be granted access only if it can demonstrate that: (1) the public
has historically enjoyed access to the place or information at issue,
and (2) allowing public and media access serves a significant posi-
tive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. 153
a. Press Access to Government Institutions-Jails and Prisons
In several cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered
whether the press has a right of access to government institutions
such as jails and prisons. In two landmark cases, the Court denied
any right of press access to prison inmates. 154 In Pell v. Procunier,
the Court considered the constitutionality of a California Depart-
ment of Corrections policy that prohibited media interviews with
individual prisoners. 155 Similarly, in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
the Court considered a Federal Bureau of Prisons ban on press in-
terviews with individual federal prisoners. 56 In both cases, the
Court rejected the media's claim that they had a constitutional
right of access to prisons. 57 Central to the Court's opinions was its
position that the First Amendment bars the government from inter-
fering with the free press, but does not "require government to ac-
cord the press special access to information not shared by members
of the public generally."'58 In Pell, Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, explained,
It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information not
available to members of the general public, that he is entitled to some constitu-
tional protection of the confidentiality of such sources, and that government can-
not restrain the publication of news emanating from such sources. It is quite an-
other. thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirma-
tive duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to
members of the public generally. 159
152. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1986) (noting the previous
adoption of this test with respect to access to criminal proceedings and then applying the test to
question whether the press has constitutional right of access to court transcript of preliminary
hearing).
153. Id. at 8.
154. See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974).
155. 417 U.S. at 819.
156. 417 U.S. at 844-45.
157. Id. at 850 (rejecting claim of press access to prisons or inmates); Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35
(explaining that the Constitution does not "require government to accord the press special access
to information not shared by members of the public generally").
158. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 149, at 420-21.
159. 417 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted).
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b. Press Access to Judicial Proceedings
In considering whether the media has a constitutional right
of access to judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court again condi-
tioned the media's access upon the degree of public access. 160 In
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court concluded that
the media has a constitutional right to attend criminal trials since:
(1) trials have historically been open to the public, 161 and (2) public
access to criminal trials serves an important societal function. 162
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, explained that the
First Amendment was adopted "against the backdrop of the long
history of trials being presumptively open," and that the guarantees
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press "prohibit the govern-
ment from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been
open to the public at the time [the First Amendment] was
adopted . . ... 163
c. Press Access to Court Documents
Although the Supreme Court itself has not ruled on the
question of whether the press has a constitutional right of access to
court documents under the First Amendment, some lower courts
have recognized such a right. 164 Recognition of a constitutionally
based right of access to judicial documents has been predicated
upon satisfaction of the two conditions outlined in Richmond News-
papers: (1) the public has historically had access to such documents,
and (2) public access serves an important societal interest. 165
With the advent of new technologies, courts have had to con-
sider what limits to place on press access to emerging evidentiary
materials. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the U.S. Su-
preme Court considered whether the press had a First Amendment
right of access to the Watergate tapes that had been admitted into
evidence. 166 The Court emphasized that the public itself had never
160. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1980).
161. Id. at 577.
162. See id. at 578 (explaining that the openness of criminal trials "has been thought to en-
hance the integrity and quality of what takes place").
163. Id. at 576.
164. See, e.g., United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160-61 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The First
Amendment guarantees the press and the public access to aspects of court proceedings, including
documents .... ").
165. See, e.g., Balt. Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Pokaski, 684 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (D. Mass. 1988).
166. 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978).
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had physical access to the tapes and that the press was not entitled
to any access superior to that of the public.167 The Court explained,
Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency may publi-
cize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the
courtroom. But the line is drawn at the courthouse door; and within, a reporter's
constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the pub-
lic. l'
Despite this Supreme Court holding, some lower federal courts have
recognized a First Amendment right of access to videotapes or au-
diotapes that have been admitted into evidence. 169
2. The Coleman Case: Press Access to Physical Evidence Under the
First Amendment
In the Coleman case, the media plaintiffs argued that they
had a First Amendment right to inspect the remaining biological
evidence. 170 The Virginia circuit court rejected this claim, refusing
to extend the constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings
and/or court documents to include a right to independent testing of
crime scene evidence.' 71
In considering whether the media plaintiffs had a constitu-
tional right to test the biological evidence, Virginia circuit court
Judge Keary Williams looked to the two-part test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers. 72 Tailoring the test to
the facts of the Coleman case, Judge Williams asked: (1) "[W]hether
retesting the Coleman DNA after conviction and execution of judg-
ment is a process historically open to the public," and (2) whether
the testing "would aid in ensuring the fairness of, and contributing
to the public confidence in, the death penalty as implemented in
Virginia."173
Turning to the first prong of the test, Judge Williams con-
cluded that "[t]he request in this case does not involve a process
that is part of the criminal justice system, much less a process that
167. Id. at 609.
168. Id. (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965)).
169. In United States v. Carpentier, for example, a federal district court in New York denied
the government's motion to place audiotapes admitted into evidence under seal. 526 F. Supp.
292, 294-95 (E.D.N.Y 1981). The court explained that "the public has a strong First Amendment
claim to access to evidence admitted in a public sentencing hearing," and therefore, the "tapes
should be disclosed." Id.
170. Request for DNA Testing and Release of Results, supra note 51, at 3.
171. Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 5-8.
172. Id. at 5-6.
173. Id. at 6.
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has been historically open to the public." 174 The circuit court noted
the absence of any precedent to support a constitutional right to
independent testing of evidence in a criminal case. 175 Judge Wil-
liams explained that the cases that the plaintiffs had cited merely
recognized a public right of access to criminal proceedings and
documents filed in connection with such proceedings. 176 Interpret-
ing this precedent to mandate independent testing of evidence in a
closed criminal case would constitute "quite a leap," and Judge Wil-
liams refused to make this leap. 177
The court next looked to the second prong of the test, consid-
ering whether a larger societal interest would be served by granting
access. 178 Judge Williams held that the results of any DNA testing
of the remaining semen evidence in the Coleman rape kit "would
have no bearing on the fairness of the death penalty as it is now
administered or on the public confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem."'1 79 The judge explained that Virginia law had been modified
since Coleman's execution and that the sophisticated DNA tests
unavailable to Coleman prior to his execution were now available to
prisoners facing the death penalty. °80 Because of such changes in
the capital punishment system in the nine years since Coleman's
execution, testing the biological evidence simply would not help to
assess the reliability of the current system.' 8l As Judge Williams
explained, "How can investigation of the death penalty as it was
implemented in 1992 be beneficial in scrutinizing the death penalty
as it is carried out in 2001 when the processes are so different?"'8 2
3. An Implausible Basis for Media Access
The Coleman case provides a stark illustration of the barri-
ers to maintaining a press claim of access under the First Amend-
ment. 8 3 Most critically, media plaintiffs face the problem of having
to demonstrate that the public has historically enjoyed the type of
174. Id. at 7.
175. Id. at 6-7.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Id. at 6-7.
178. Id. at 8. Judge Williams interpreted this second prong to require that the granting of ac-
cess play "an important role in ensuring fairness of the process and contributing to public confi-
dence in our criminal justice system as it operates today." Id.




183. See supra notes 170-83 and accompanying text.
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access being sought.18 4 Arguably, a court could find that the histori-
cal public right of access to court documents is sufficiently analo-
gous to public access to physical evidence to support a constitu-
tional claim for independent testing of such evidence. In other
words, a court could interpret historical access at a high level of
generality, holding, for example, that the historical right of access
to court documents is more accurately described as a historical
right of access to all exhibits introduced into evidence-whether
paper documents or biological evidence. 8 5 As discussed earlier in
this Note, however, it seems more likely that a court would exercise
its discretion-including the discretion inherent in characterizing
historical public access-to block access to biological evidence. 8 6
Since granting access risks exposing the fallibility of the appellate
review system in death penalty cases, a court that is part of this
system of review has a very real interest in denying access, and
thus, protecting its own reputation.187
Even if a court were to find a historical basis for public ac-
cess to biological evidence, it could nonetheless deny a First
Amendment claim on the ground that such access does not serve a
larger societal interest. 88 As demonstrated by the Coleman case,
the question of societal interest is a very subjective inquiry, offering
considerable discretion to the court.18 9 In Coleman, the court found
that the testing of the DNA evidence would not have an impact on
184. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) ("First, because, a 'tra-
dition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experiences' we have considered whether
the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public." (citations
omitted)); Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 5-6.
185. An example of a court's use of this level of generality can be found in Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In that case, the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of a Massachusetts law that barred the press from the courtroom during the testi-
mony of sexual assault victims under the age of eighteen. Id. at 598. The Court concluded that
access to a criminal trial did not depend on the historical openness of a certain type of criminal
trial. Id. at 604 n.13. Rather, there is a presumption of openness of all criminal trials, and this
openness cannot be defeated on the grounds that a particular type of trial had not historically
been open to the public. Id.
186. See supra Part II.A.4.
187. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
188. See Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 8; see also Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 8 (ar-
ticulating the two-prong test for granting press access).
189. Judge Williams concluded that DNA testing of the evidence in the Coleman case would
have no impact on public confidence in the current death penalty system. See Opinion Letter,
supra note 44, at 8. Yet a compelling argument can be made that Coleman's exoneration would
have a dramatic impact on public confidence in Virginia's capital punishment system. See Edito-
rial, Test Coleman's Execution, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, June 5, 2001, at A12 (arguing
that proof of a wrongful execution "surely would have great bearing on public confidence" and
that "so tragic an error would demonstrate in a most dramatic way the fallibility of human
judgment, and provide a powerful argument against the abomination that is the death penalty").
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public confidence in the death penalty system since the current sys-
tem recognizes the right of condemned prisoners to have sophisti-
cated DNA tests performed on any physical evidence. 190 Judge Wil-
liams conveniently declined to mention, however, that there is no
DNA evidence in the vast majority of criminal cases. 191 Thus, many
capital defendants today are in the same position as Roger Coleman
was when he was convicted and sentenced to death in 1981, before
DNA testing existed. 192 An exoneration of Coleman would reveal the
fallibility of traditional forms of evidence-from jailhouse infor-
mants to visual hair comparison, 193 and would expose the inability
of the appellate system to identify every wrongful conviction. Be-
cause many capital convictions continue to rest exclusively on tradi-
tional forms of evidence, 94 exposing the fallibility of these types of
evidence must have relevance in evaluating the health of our cur-
rent capital punishment system. 95 Additionally, if the public real-
ized that the appellate system was an imperfect mechanism for
identifying error, public support for the death penalty could be
greatly undermined. 196 Thus, it seems disingenuous for Judge Wil-
liams to conclude that testing the evidence in the Coleman case
"would have no bearing on the fairness of the death penalty as it is
now administered or on the public confidence in the criminal justice
system."197
C. Unique State Claims
Plaintiffs have advanced creative legal theories in an effort
to gain post-execution access to physical evidence. Recognizing that
most avenues to access are extinguished upon the death of the of-
fender, plaintiffs in civil suits have carefully searched state codes
for provisions that might afford access to other interested parties.
In several cases, seldom-used statutes have been resurrected or ret-
190. See Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 8.
191. See John C. Tucker, Earley's Opposition to DNA Test Showed Poor Judgment,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 18, 2001, at Bll (noting that "in the vast majority of criminal cases,
including murder cases, there is no DNA evidence to test").
192. See id.
193. See Smolowe, supra note 80 (explaining that Coleman was convicted on the basis of
three pieces of evidence-the testimony of a jailhouse informant, visual hair comparison evi-
dence, and blood type evidence).
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See John Aloysius Farrell, Cry of "Innocent!" TRumps Moral Claim, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 27, 2000, at Fl (attributing the dramatic decline in support for the death penalty to public
concern over the risk of executing the innocent).
197. See Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 8.
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rofitted to serve a purpose that the original drafters never antici-
pated.
1. Virginia: A Trial Court's Discretion to Donate Evidence to a
Charity
Nonprofit organizations petitioned for post-execution access
to physical evidence in both the O'Dell and Coleman cases. 198 In
O'Dell, two nonprofit organizations-the Roman Catholic Diocese of
Richmond and the Louisiana Crisis Assistance Center-jointly filed
suit. 199 In Coleman, a single charitable organization-Centurion
Ministries-joined several media plaintiffs in a combined effort to
gain access to the physical evidence. 200 In both the O'Dell and
Coleman suits, the charitable organizations' claims to access relied
primarily on a Virginia statute that grants trial judges the discre-
tion to donate evidence in closed criminal cases to charitable or-
ganizations. 20 1 The statute provides: "[U]nless objection with suffi-
cient cause is made, the trial court in any criminal case may order
the donation or destruction of any or all exhibits received in evi-
dence during the course of the trial ... at any time after exhaustion
of all appellate remedies." 20 2 The statute further provides that
"[u]pon petition of any organization which is exempt from taxation
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the court in
its sound discretion may order donation of an exhibit to such chari-
table organization. 2 3
In both the Coleman and O'Dell cases, the petitioning chari-
ties argued that the conclusive determination of guilt or innocence
through post-execution DNA testing would assist them in their mis-
sions of educating the public about capital punishment.20 4 In the
O'Dell petition, the plaintiffs explained that "[w]hether the indi-
viduals executed by the state are in fact guilty of their crimes is of
utmost importance and the Evidence is the best evidence available
as to whether the death penalty system functioned properly in the
198. Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 10; Pe-
tition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 14.
199. Petition for Donation of Certain Items, supra note 21, at 1-2.
200. Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 1; Peti-
tion for Appeal, supra note 13, at 14.
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4 (Michie 2000); Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Do-
nation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 1; Petition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 1.
202. § 19.2-270.4(A).
203. Id. § 19.2-270.4(D) (emphasis added).
204. Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 4-8; Pe-
tition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 4-5.
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case of Joseph O'Dell. '20 5 Similarly, in petitioning for access to the
evidence in Coleman, Centurion Ministries explained that gaining
access to the evidence would further its charitable mission of vindi-
cating "individuals wrongly convicted of crimes" and educating "the
public with regard to the risk of wrongful convictions." 20 6
Attempts to gain access to DNA evidence pursuant to this
Virginia statute have thus far been unsuccessful. 20 7 In both Cole-
man and O'Dell, the courts exercised their discretion and refused to
donate the evidence to the petitioning charities. 208 In O'Dell, the
Virginia circuit court concluded that the evidence had not been suf-
ficiently protected from tampering or contamination during its
years in storage and that donation of the sample would therefore be
inappropriate. 20 9 In Coleman, Judge Keary Williams of the Virginia
Circuit Court held that the statute only allowed for donation of evi-
dence that had been actually introduced at trial.210 Since the bio-
logical evidence in Coleman had not, in fact, been introduced at
Coleman's original 1981 trial,211 the court did not have the author-
ity under the statute to donate the evidence to a charitable organi-
zation.212
The Coleman and O'Dell cases together illustrate the diffi-
culty of gaining access to physical evidence under the Virginia stat-
ute. Under Judge Williams's ruling in Coleman, a petitioner must
first demonstrate that the evidence sought was actually introduced
at trial. 213 Of the group of cases in which DNA technology could
posthumously exonerate an executed offender, the biological evi-
dence may not have been introduced at trial in a significant number
of such cases. Without the ability to identify the source of the bio-
logical evidence through DNA testing, the prosecution may have
simply found that the evidence had insufficient probative value and
was not worthy of introduction at trial.
205. Petition for Appeal, supra note 13, at 13.
206. Petition of Centurion Ministries, Inc. for Donation of Exhibits, supra note 45, at 4.
207. See Virginia v. Coleman, Nos. 106-81 & 108-81, slip op. at 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Buchanan
County Sept. 7, 2000) (unpublished court order); Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 3-5; Record of
Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 82.
208. Coleman, Nos. 106-82 & 108-81, slip op. at 2; Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 3-5; Re-
cord of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 82.
209. Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 91 (holding that donating the evidence to the
petitioning charities would be inappropriate given the "many irregularities ... in the handling of
the evidence").
210. See Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 5.
211. Id. at 2 (noting that "DNA evidence was collected during the investigation of the mur-
der, but never introduced into evidence at trial").




Even if the plaintiff demonstrates that the disputed evidence
was introduced at trial and is therefore eligible for donation, the
statute still grants the trial court broad discretion over whether to
donate the evidence to the petitioning charity. 214 Rather than pro-
viding the court with specific factors to consider in exercising this
discretion, the statute simply states, "[T]he court in its sound dis-
cretion may order donation of an exhibit to such charitable organi-
zation." 215 Exercising this broad discretion, the O'Dell court denied
access because of the questionable integrity of the evidence. 216 Al-
though the evidence was continuously in the state's custody and the
DNA tests themselves would have exposed any contamination or
attempts to tamper with the sample, 217 the court nevertheless found
that donation of the sample was inappropriate. 218 As long as courts
enjoy such broad discretion in considering donation, it is unrealistic
to expect that plaintiffs will prevail under the statute. As men-
tioned previously in this Note, proof of a wrongful execution would
undermine the credibility of the entire death penalty appellate
process.219 When given broad discretion, courts can be expected to
deny access so as to protect their own reputations.
2. Texas: Access Premised on Potential Suit Against the Actual
Perpetrator(s)
The case of Richard Wayne Jones provides another example
of the creative use of a state statute to gain access to physical evi-
dence. 220 The State of Texas executed Jones in August of 2000.221 He
had been convicted thirteen years earlier for the murder of Tammy
Livingston.222 Although Jones originally confessed to the crime, he
214. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4 (Michie 2000) (providing that the trial court "in its
sound discretion may order donation of an exhibit" to a charitable organization).
215. Id. (emphasis added).
216. See Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 91.
217. See id. at 86 (providing explanation by plaintiffs attorney, Paul Enzinna, that "[t]his
evidence has been in custody of the state for the past fifteen years"); Petition for Appeal, supra
note 13, at 10, 11 n.7 (referring to affidavit of DNA expert Barry Scheck, which explained that
"contamination cannot be detected until DNA testing is performed," and explaining that the DNA
tests themselves would reveal any tampering).
218. See Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 91.
219. See Farrell, supra note 196.
220. See Petition for Equitable Bill of Discovery, supra note 51, at 1-2.
221. Malone, supra note 43.
222. Jones was convicted in July of 1987. See Application for Reprieve from Execution, Com-
mutation of Sentence, and Conditional Pardon at 10, In re Richard Wayne Jones (Proceeding
before the Hon. George W. Bush, Governor of the State of Texas and the Texas Board of Pardons
and Parole).
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later retracted the admission, explaining that he signed a confes-
sion only after being subjected to a- grueling interrogation and
threats by detectives. 223
According to Jones, his sister, Brenda Jones Ashmore,
pleaded for his assistance after she and her boyfriend, Walter Sell-
ers, had killed the victim. 224 Jones eventually admitted to helping
Ashmore and Sellers dispose of the victim's body, but denied any
involvement in the murder itself. 225 Considerable evidence sup-
ported Jones's account. 226 Several people gave statements, or testi-
fied before the grand jury, that Sellers had attempted to sell them
the victim's checks, credit cards, and car. 227 At least one witness
claimed that Sellers even confessed to them that he was the mur-
derer.228 Also, while Sellers was seen with considerable blood on his
clothing near the time of the murder, Jones's clothes only contained
small specks of blood, which is consistent with his story of having
merely disposed of the body.229
After the execution, Jones's two sons sought access to the
physical evidence in the case in order to perform DNA testing.230
Convinced of their father's innocence, the sons believed that the
DNA tests would demonstrate that their father's sister, Ashmore,
and her boyfriend, Sellers, were the actual perpetrators. 23 1 In re-
223. According to Jones, he was initially subjected to twelve hours of continuous interroga-
tion, from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m., during which time he was denied food and sleep. Id. at 15. Offi-
cers threatened him with physical harm and allegedly convinced Jones that both he and his
pregnant girlfriend would be sentenced to death, and the child born on death row, if he failed to
cooperate. Id. at 14-18. Jones took the stand at his trial and denied his involvement in the mur-
der, explaining to jurors that his confession was the product of police coercion and threats. Id. at
31.
224. Id. at 21.
225. Id. at 20. Jones did not admit to helping dispose of the body at trial, id. at 31, and failed
to tell his own lawyers about his involvement in disposing of the body, id. at 26. Jones claimed
that he originally elected not to tell the entire story because he was trying to protect his sister.
Id. at 26.
226. See id. at 22-25.
227. Id. at 24.
228. Id. (mentioning that Douglas Daffern testified before the grand jury that Sellers claimed
to have killed two women). Additionally, another individual, Michael Barton, contacted Jones's
attorney before trial and confessed that he and Sellers had murdered Livingston together. Id. at
29.
229. James King testified that Sellers had blood on his clothing when he tried to sell him
checks, identification, and a car. Id. at 24. Similarly, Scott Christian gave a statement that
shortly after the murder, Sellers came to his house to try to sell him the checks and identification
of a woman fitting the description of the victim. Id. According to Christian, Sellers seemed nerv-
ous and upset, and his clothes appeared to be spattered with blood. Id. In contrast, Jones himself
only had two small specks of blood on his lower pants leg. See id. at 37.
230. See Petition for Equitable Bill of Discovery, supra note 51, at 1; Malone, supra note 43.
231. See Malone, supra note 43 (explaining that if DNA tests show that Ashmore and/or Sell-
ers were in the victim's car, this would go a long way in corroborating Jones's claim of innocence).
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sponse to the sons' efforts to implicate them, Ashmore and Sellers
allegedly threatened to kill the boys' mother.232
In seeking access to the physical evidence in the case,
Jones's sons relied on Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.233 Under Rule 202, a person can petition the court for an order
that authorizes discovery to investigate a potential claim or suit.234
The Texas district court judge barred the sons from arguing that
Jones was innocent of Livingston's murder.235 Therefore, the sons
based their Rule 202 petition on a potential suit against Ashmore
and Sellers for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud,
and misrepresentation. 236 In their petition, the sons requested the
court's permission to test the physical evidence and depose Ash-
more and Sellers. 237 The court has yet to rule on this request; how-
ever, the sons' attorney, Gerald Staton, indicated that he expects
the judge to grant their request. 238
Although the Rule 202 petition in this case may prove suc-
cessful in gaining access to the physical evidence, it is unlikely that
this approach will be easily duplicated in other cases. The viability
of the sons' Rule 202 petition turns on features unique to the case:
the history of threats from Ashmore and Sellers, and significant
evidence that points to Ashmore's and Seller's involvement in the
crime. Only when a plaintiff can convince a judge that there is a
viable potential civil suit against the actual perpetrators will such a
claim hold real promise of success. Clearly, other plaintiffs, with
legitimate claims, will be unable to mount such an argument to
seek access.
D. Negotiations with the State
Direct negotiations with state officials constitute an addi-
tional avenue to obtaining access to physical evidence in a state's
custody. 239 If a state simply agrees to access, then the interested
third party need not pursue a civil suit to obtain court-ordered ac-
232. Telephone Interview with Gerald Staton, Partner, Staton & Taylor (Feb. 14, 2001)
[hereinafter Interview with Staton].
233. Petition for Equitable Bill of Discovery, supra note 51, at 1.
234. TEX. R. CIv. P. 202.
235. Interview with Staton, supra note 232; see also Malone, supra note 43.
236. Interview with Staton, supra note 232.
237. Petition for Equitable Bill of Discovery, supra note 51, at 1.
238. Interview with Staton, supra note 232.
239. See Sydney Freedberg, DNA Clears Inmate Too Late, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 15,
2000, at 1A (explaining that deceased inmate's lawyers gained access to DNA evidence through
the process of negotiating with state officials).
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cess. In the cases considered thus far in this Note, a civil suit
proved necessary either because the state categorically opposed ac-
cess, 240 or because the parties sought court mediation regarding the
terms of access. 241
Negotiation with state officials produced a favorable result
in the case of Frank Lee Smith.242 In 1985, Smith was arrested and
charged with the rape and murder of an eight-year-old child.243
Smith was on parole at the time of the murder, and his two previ-
ous homicide convictions made him a likely suspect. 244 Although no
physical evidence linked him to the crime,245 Smith was convicted
and sentenced to death in 1986 based on the testimony of two eye-
witnesses who identified him as the man they saw leaving the vic-
tim's home on the night of the murder. 246
Years after Smith's conviction, a key prosecution witness re-
canted her testimony, insisting that she had wrongly identified
Smith after police pressured her and warned her that Smith was
dangerous. 247 Smith's lawyers, convinced of his innocence, re-
quested the courts' permission to have DNA testing performed on
semen evidence. 248 The State of Florida strongly opposed the testing
and accused Smith's lawyers of merely trying to delay justice.249
While his lawyers continued to plead for access to the evidence,
Smith was diagnosed with cancer, and died in 1999 in a prison hos-
pital.250
After Smith's death, his lawyers continued to fight to have
the DNA evidence tested and sought an order to keep the State
240. For a discussion of the O'Dell case, see supra note 26 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the Coleman case, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
241. The Felker case is an example of an instance in which the state did not oppose access,
but wanted the court to condition access on certain terms being met. See Interview with Byrd,
supra note 140.
242. See Freedberg, supra note 239.
243. See Charles Savage et al., Smith's Lawyers Say Officials Knew a Decade Ago He Might
Be Innocent, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 16, 2000 (explaining that Smith was arrested soon after the
1985 crime when neighbors indicated that Smith resembled a composite sketch of the perpetra-
tor).
244. Freedberg, supra note 239.
245. Id.
246. Malone, supra note 43.
247. Freedberg, supra note 239.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. After Smith's death, his lawyers accused prosecutors of ignoring evidence of his in-
nocence for years and blocking DNA testing while Smith was alive: "We knew he was innocent in
December of 1989.... We told the courts, and we told them who was the real killer, but no one
cared, and they kept Frank Lee Smith on death row for another 10 years until he died." Id.
20021
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from destroying the evidence. 251 Initially, prosecutors maintained
their opposition to the testing.25 2 But, through the process of nego-
tiations, the parties were able to reach an agreement, 253 under
which the evidence was sent to an FBI lab for testing.2 4 In Decem-
ber 2000, the FBI announced that the DNA tests exonerated
Smith.255
The Smith case represents the first time that a death row
prisoner has been posthumously exonerated through DNA test-
ing.256 The case prompted Florida Governor Jeb Bush to suggest
that DNA testing should be made available to other condemned in-
mates, and has revitalized the campaign for a moratorium on exe-
cutions in Florida. 257 Also, the outcome in this case demonstrates
that negotiation with state officials offers a possible avenue of ac-
cess to DNA evidence after the death of the prisoner. Unfortu-
nately, this avenue is unlikely to be successful in cases in which the
perpetrator was actually executed. As the O'Dell and Coleman cases
demonstrate, states are strongly opposed to granting access to evi-
dence and go to the greatest lengths to prevent testing in those in-
stances in which the state has the most to lose in terms of its own
credibility. 258
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ALLOWING
POSTHUMOUS DNA TESTING
A. The Spirit of Open Government Records: An Informed Electorate
Means a More Effective Democracy
In determining the proper scope of public access to govern-
ment records and institutions, courts and legislatures have ac-
knowledged that the openness of government records serves an im-
portant role in a well-functioning democracy. In several cases, for
example, the Supreme Court has justified recognition of the com-






256. See Malone, supra note 43.
257. Freedberg, supra note 239 ("A spokeswoman for Gov[ernor] Jeb Bush said ... that the
governor wants to offer DNA testing to other condemned inmates."); see also Malone, supra note
43 ("Death penalty opponents said they believe the Smith case could lead to a moratorium on
executions in Florida.").
258. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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such access: (1) fosters healthy democratic institutions,259 and (2)
provides a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial proc-
ess to public scrutiny.260 Similarly, the Court's finding that the
First Amendment guarantees press access is predicated on the idea
that an electorate that is well informed by the media enhances de-
mocracy. 261 Legislatures have also recognized the importance of al-
lowing public access to government records. 262 Congress and most
state legislatures have opted to codify or expand the common law
right of access to government information. 263 Again, these statutory
provisions are premised on the notion that a well-informed elector-
ate is the cornerstone of a well-functioning democracy. 264
A state's use of its ultimate power-the power to take life-
calls for the highest level of public scrutiny. If the public is to as-
sess properly the reliability of its capital punishment system, and
any potential corruption within that system, it must have access to
information in the government's control. The government should
not be permitted to conceal information in an effort to preserve pub-
lic confidence in the infallibility of the death penalty. If the elector-
ate is to have an informed debate about the appropriateness of the
death penalty, it must have full access to information, and this ac-
cess should include the ability to posthumously test DNA evidence
in the state's custody.
B. The Relevance of Posthumous DNA Testing to an Informed Policy
Debate About the Death Penalty
Posthumous DNA testing in death penalty cases, if allowed,
could provide highly relevant information in a national death pen-
alty debate, which is increasingly focused on the risk of executing
the innocent. 265 The striking number of exonerations that have oc-
curred prior to execution-absent proof that an innocent person has
been executed-have dramatically transformed the death penalty
259. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-73 (1980) (explaining that
public access to the courts promotes free discussion of governmental affairs).
260. See id. at 570; Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976) (citing Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
261. Underlying the First Amendment right of access is the understanding that "a major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
262. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-71.1 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704 (Michie 2001).
263. 37A AM. JUR. 2D Freedom of Information Act §§ 2, 5 (2001).
264. Id. § 1 ('The basic purpose of the [Freedom of Information Act] is to ensure an informed
citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and
to hold the governors accountable to the governed.").
265. See Farrell, supra note 196.
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debate. 266 In February of 2000, Illinois Governor George Ryan de-
clared a moratorium on executions in Illinois following that state's
thirteenth death row exoneration. 267 In the wake of numerous exon-
erations nationwide, support for the death penalty has fallen from
over eighty percent a decade ago to a recent estimate of only sixty-
six percent. 268
Proponents of capital punishment have themselves sug-
gested the importance of proving that an innocent person has been
executed. 269 Despite clear evidence that nearly one hundred inno-
cent people have been freed from death row since 1973, many death
penalty proponents continue to defend the infallibility of America's
capital punishment system.270 Proponents explain that these exon-
erations provide convincing evidence that the appeals process
works-that every miscarriage of justice is uncovered during the
multiple layers of appeals. 271 In defending the current system,
many proponents insist that not one innocent person has been exe-
cuted in recent history.27 2 Conservative legal scholar Paul Cassell
contends that there is no documented case of a wrongful execution
in the United States in the past fifty years. 273 Cassell explains,
"[T]he abolitionists are well-funded. The reason they haven't been
266. Id. (noting that the question of the risk of executing the innocent has transformed the
death penalty debate).
267. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan: "Until I Can Be Sure'" Illinois Is First State to
Suspend Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2000, at 1. In his public statement, Governor Ryan
"decried the state's 'shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting them on Death
Row'.... Id.
268. Farrell, supra note 196.
269. Death penalty proponent Paul Cassell has dismissed studies showing widespread error
in capital cases, reasoning that the researchers of such studies have been "unable to find a single
case in which an innocent person was executed" and "[tihus, the most important error rate-the
rate of mistaken executions-was zero." See Cohn, supra note 49, at 33. Similarly, death penalty
supporter Robert Pambianco argues that "[t]he best opponents [of the death penalty] can do is
point to cases of individuals who were sentenced to die but who, for one reason or another, were
later exonerated or had their sentences reduced. But these folks are alive. They are anything but
evidence that innocent people are being executed." Pambianco, supra note 48.
270. Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999, at 66, 68; see also Cohn,
supra note 49, at 33 ("Death-penalty supporters in this country have invested considerable en-
ergy in reassuring the public that the execution of an innocent person is virtually impossible.").
271. E.g., Cynthia Tucker, Some Case Will Sway Supporter of Death Penalty, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., June 25, 2000, at 5B (explaining that "death penalty proponents cite death row releases
as evidence that the system is self-correcting').
272. See Cohn, supra note 49, at 33 (calling the idea that an innocent person has been put to
death "urban legend"); Jeff Jacoby, Supporters of Capital Punishment Can Cheer Governor
Ryan's Decision, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 2000, at A15; Pambianco, supra note 48.
273. Cohn, supra note 49, at 33.
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able to find someone [wrongfully executed] isn't the lack of energy
and funding; it's because there isn't anyone out there to find. '274
Similarly, elected public officials have continued to express
absolute confidence in the capital punishment system, despite the
alarming number of proven wrongful convictions,275 and the fortuity
of many of these exonerations. 276 In 1998, for example, a spokesman
for then-Virginia Attorney General Mark L. Earley boasted, "Vir-
ginians can rest assured that if someone is executed in the Com-
monwealth they're guilty .... Virginia's criminal justice system is
a model for the nation and as fail-safe as it gets. '277 Likewise, when
then-presidential candidate George W. Bush was questioned about
the risk of executing the innocent, he assured the public that every
person executed in the State of Texas had been guilty of the
crime.278
Posthumous access to DNA evidence is of particular impor-
tance as the public debate over the risk of executing the innocent
remains fixated on the ability to prove that an innocent person has
in fact been executed. Death penalty opponents agree with propo-
nents that absolute proof of a wrongful execution could transform
the death penalty debate. 279 Richard Dieter, director of the Death
Penalty Information Center in Washington D.C., an anti-death
penalty educational organization, is among those who believe that
evidence of a wrongful execution could have a profound effect on the
national death penalty debate. 280 "It could be very important," Di-
eter explains, because "[o]ne concern about the death penalty is
that it is an irrevocable act. '281
274. Id.
275. Nearly 100 innocent people have been released from death row since 1973. See Death
Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/innoc.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
276. Dieter, supra note 50 (explaining that many cases of innocence "were discovered not be-
cause of the normal appeals process, but rather as the result of new scientific techniques, inves-
tigation by journalists, and the dedicated work of expert attorneys, not available to the typical
death row inmate").
277. Frank Green, Freed Inmates Tell Their Stories; Death Row Residents Wrongfully Con-
victed, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 1998, at Al.
278. Peter Grier, Death Penalty Under Siege, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 14, 2000, at 1
(reporting statement of then-Governor George W. Bush expressing confidence that every person
executed in Texas during his term in office has been "guilty of the crime charged.").
279. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 271 (suggesting that proof of a wrongful execution would
undermine remaining support for the death penalty); see also Berlow, supra note 270, at 68 (not-
ing that "[o]pponents of the death penalty believe that the execution of an innocent person would
have a profound effect on public support for capital punishment").
280. David G. Savage, '92 Execution Haunts Death Penalty Foes; Activists Fight for DNA Test




Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a consistent
supporter of the death penalty during her twenty years on the
bench, has recently commented on the risk of executing the inno-
cent.282 In July of 2001, Justice O'Connor publicly stated that the
number of recently freed death row inmates suggests that "the sys-
tem may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be exe-
cuted."283 Proof of a single wrongful execution would certainly pro-
voke additional high-level dialogue regarding the soundness of the
death penalty as public policy.
C. Forcing a More Honest Dialogue About Criminal Justice Reform
1. The Unique Opportunity Afforded By DNA
The availability of DNA technology as a means of proving
innocence has resulted in an increase in the rate of death penalty
exonerations. 284 The power of DNA evidence has been twofold: (1)
the technology has spared lives that might otherwise have been lost
to execution or years in prison, and (2) it has exposed law enforce-
ment corruption and the fallibility of forms of evidence commonly
believed to be highly reliable. 285 For example, DNA evidence has
exonerated condemned prisoners in cases in which the conviction
rested on multiple eyewitness identifications, 286 and in instances




285. See Patrick Leahy, Symposium: Serenity Now or Insanity Later?: The Impact of Post-
Conviction DNA Testing on the Criminal Justice System, Introduction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 605,
605 (2001) (explaining that post-conviction DNA testing provides a unique opportunity to iden-
tify broad patterns of error and abuse in the criminal justice system, including inadequate coun-
sel, mistaken identification, and prosecutorial misconduct); see also Michael J. Saks et al., To-
ward a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous Convictions, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV.
669, 669 (2001) (noting that DNA technology has "return[ed] innocent people to freedom" and has
"opened an exceptionally valuable window through which to view the criminal justice system").
286. For example, Kirk Bloodsworth was convicted and sentenced to death in the State of
Maryland based on the testimony of three eyewitnesses who all claimed to have seen him with
the nine-year-old victim immediately before her disappearance. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 15, at
213-220. Nine years after his original conviction, Bloodsworth was completely exonerated by
DNA evidence. Id. at 220.
287. In Virginia, Earl Washington was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1982 rape and
murder. Francis X. Clines, Furor Anew with Release of Man Who Was Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 2001, at A23. Washington, who was mentally retarded, confessed to the crime. Id. In 1994,
DNA tests were performed that excluded Washington as the perpetrator, and then-Governor
Douglas Wilder commuted his sentence to life without the possibility of parole. Id. Washington
was finally pardoned and released in 2001 after more sophisticated DNA tests further exoner-
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highlighted the problems of police abuse in obtaining confessions 288
and has drawn attention to the deadly impact of withholding excul-
patory evidence. 289 The technology has also exposed the risks of us-
ing jailhouse snitches and untested scientific techniques to obtain
convictions. 290
The era of post-conviction DNA exonerations, however, will
be short-lived. 291 Law enforcement officials currently use DNA test-
ing early in the investigative process to determine whether to
eliminate someone as a suspect or proceed with a prosecution. 292
Thus, the age of post-conviction application of DNA testing provides
a unique opportunity to assess the reliability of traditional forms of
evidence and investigative techniques. 293 Rather than squandering
this opportunity, courts should maximize the insight available
through DNA technology by granting third-party requests for post-
execution access to DNA evidence. In other words, the use of DNA
to assess the accuracy of convictions should not be limited to active
ated him. Id. In a similar case, Ronald Jones was convicted in Illinois of the 1985 rape and mur-
der of Debra Smith. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 15, at 220. Jones signed a confession after ten
hours in police custody, but claimed that he admitted to the crime only after police beat him and
took him to the abandoned building where the murder took place. Id. Ten years after his convic-
tion, Jones was exonerated through DNA testing. Id.
288. In the case of Earl Washington, police interrogated the highly suggestible Washington
over a period of two days and were able to elicit confessions for several unsolved crimes. Brooke
A. Masters, Missteps on Road to Injustice; In Virginia, Innocent Man Was Nearly Executed,
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2000, at Al; see also supra note 287 (discussing the Washington case). The
police did not seem to be troubled by the numerous inconsistencies in Washington's confessions.
Id. As one police sergeant explained, "It was almost like a big party. 'Come on down, this guy is
confessing to everything.' " Id. When Washington failed to give the police the specific response
they sought, the officers simply asked the question again, and the mentally retarded Washington
changed his answer to satisfy the officers. Id. When, for example, police asked Washington
whether the victim was white or black, Washington first responded that she was black. Id. When
detectives asked Washington the same question again, this time Washington gave the "right"
answer, telling officers that the victim was white. Id. In an Illinois case, DNA evidence exoner-
ated four young men who had been convicted of the rape and murder of a medical student. Ken
Armstrong et al., Coercive and Illegal Tactics Torpedo Scores of Cook County Murder Cases, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 16, 2001, at 1. One of the young men, who was fourteen years old at the time of his
arrest, explained why he falsely confessed to police: "They threatened to do things and got me
thinking they could do them.... One said he would smack me in the mouth if I didn't cooper-
ate.... Then they told me I would go home if I gave them what they wanted." Id.
289. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 15, at 149-57.
290. Id. at 158-71 (explaining the unreliability of some forms of scientific evidence, like vis-
ual hair comparison, and suggesting reforms to prevent the use of junk science in criminal
cases); id. at 156-57 (noting that the testimony of jailhouse snitches was used to convict twenty-
one percent of the individuals cleared by DNA testing through the Innocence Project).
291. See Saks et al., supra note 285, at 670 (explaining that "in cases where DNA typing can
be performed it will routinely be performed, and the post-conviction DNA exoneration cases that
today are almost commonplace will disappear").
292. Id.
293. Id. at 669-70.
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criminal cases, which are in the process of being appealed. Instead,
the search for error should be extended to post-execution review in
an effort to gather as much information as possible about the func-
tioning of our criminal justice system.
2. Overcoming Resistance to Reform
In response to the frequency of wrongful convictions and the
fortuity of their discovery, many have advocated abolishing the
death penalty or suspending its use. 294 Others have identified com-
mon patterns of faulty evidence and official misconduct in known
cases of wrongful convictions and have proposed reforms to reduce
the risk of convicting and executing the innocent. 295 For example,
Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld of Cardozo Law School's Innocence
Project have identified a pattern of common errors in the sixty-five
wrongful convictions that the Innocence Project has identified. They
have suggested the following reforms: (1) changing the way line-ups
and other identification processes are conducted in order to reduce
the risk of mistaken identification; (2) videotaping all interroga-
tions; (3) employing a presumption that the testimony of jailhouse
snitches/informants is unreliable and admitting such testimony
only when certain criteria are satisfied; 296 (4) establishing inde-
pendent crime laboratories; (5) increasing funding for public de-
fenders and appointed defense counsel; and (6) creating perform-
ance standards to deal exclusively with misconduct by criminal de-
fense attorneys and prosecutors. 297
Despite the alarm bell sounded by increasing numbers of
DNA exonerations, courts and legislatures in the 1990s aggres-
294. Andrew H. Malcolm, Tainted Verdicts Resurrect Specter of Executing the Innocent, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 1989, at A18 ("Opponents of the death penalty say [the mere possibility of execut-
ing the innocent] should be sufficient to outlaw executions."). In 1997, the American Bar Associa-
tion "called for a moratorium on executions until the death penalty could be administered fairly
and with less risk to the innocent." Editorial, Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
1999, at A16.
295. See, e.g., SCHECK ET AL., supra note 15, at 255-60 (outlining "A Short List of Reforms to
Protect the Innocent"); Saks et al., supra note 285, at 672-83 (proposing a model act to reduce the
risk of wrongful convictions).
296. Scheck and Neufeld provide several examples of factors that should be considered in de-
ciding whether to allow the testimony of a jailhouse informant. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note
15, at 256-57. These factors include: (1) whether the statement can be confirmed by extrinsic
evidence; (2) whether the statement "contain[s] details or leads to the discovery of evidence
known only to the perpetrator"; (3) the general character of the snitch; and (4) whether the
snitch is a "recidivist snitch/informer." Id.
297. Id. at 255-60.
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sively sought to expand the use of the death penalty. 298 Rather than
implementing reforms to reduce the risk of wrongful executions,
courts and legislatures took steps to curtail the capital appeals
process and to decrease funding for attorneys representing death
row inmates.299 In 1996, for example, Congress passed the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 300 which
makes it nearly impossible to succeed on a successive habeas corpus
petition.301 Also in 1996, Congress voted to withdraw funding from
capital case resource centers nationwide. 30 2 These centers have pro-
vided quality representation to many prisoners on death row and
have kept track of which inmates are in need of representation. 30 3
Critics claimed, however, that the centers were "little more than
taxpayer-funded think tanks for the anti-death penalty move-
ment. ' '30 4 Measures like the AEDPA and the elimination of funds to
resource centers arguably make it more difficult to expose wrongful
convictions because these changes undermine effective legal repre-
sentation and limit access to the courts. 30 5
298. Berlow, supra note 270, at 84 ("The Supreme Court, Congress, and many states have
moved during the past decade to expedite executions by making it more difficult for defendants
to have their appeals heard.").
299. See Naftali Bendavid, The Hangman Cometh: Twenty Years After the Supreme Court
Restored the Death Penalty, Congress Made Two Big Moves Intended to Speed Up Executions,
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at 20, 20 (noting that in 1996 Congress defunded capital resource
centers nationwide and reformed habeas corpus so as to curtail the appeals process).
300. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255,
2261-2266 (Supp. V 1999)).
301. See Bendavid, supra note 299, at 20 (explaining that the new law "allows only one ap-
peal in federal court, except under extraordinary circumstances, and the appeal must be filed
within one year" of the exhaustion of state remedies).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 21.
304. Id.
305. Dieter, supra note 50 ("The current emphasis on faster executions, less resources for the
defense, and an expansion in the number of death cases means that the execution of innocent
people is inevitable. The increasing number of innocent defendants being found on death row is a
clear sign that our process for sentencing people to death is fraught with fundamental errors-
errors which cannot be remedied once an execution occurs."). Critics of the AEDPA point to cases
in which death row prisoners were able to establish their innocence on successive habeas peti-
tions. See Bendavid, supra note 299, at 20. Under the new AEDPA regime, these cases very well
could have resulted in execution of the innocent. Id. Critics often point to the case of Lloyd
Schlup, a Missouri death row prisoner who was sentenced to death in 1984 for killing a fellow
inmate while serving time for another crime. Id. Years after Schlup's conviction, his appellate
attorney found several eyewitnesses and a prison videotape, all of which corroborated Schlup's
claim of innocence. Id. This new evidence proving Schlup's innocence was raised on a successive
habeas petition, and Schlup was subsequently spared from execution. Id. Lawyers familiar with
Schlup's case insist that his subsequent appeal would not have been allowed under the AEDPA
and that he would have been executed. Id.
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Admittedly, in the past couple of years, some moderate
steps have been taken to protect innocent defendants. 306 A number
of states, for example, have enacted legislation that provides pris-
oners with post-conviction access to DNA evidence.30 7 Additionally,
some state legislatures have recently increased funding for indigent
defense. 308 What has not yet emerged, however, is the criminal jus-
tice revolution that the lessons of DNA exonerations demands. 309
Proof of an innocent person's execution may be the only thing that
is capable of capturing the nation's attention and of prompting a
serious dialogue about the full extent of needed reforms. Perhaps
only the shock of our collective complicity in a wrongful execution
will be enough to trigger this honest dialogue.
D. Addressing Policy Arguments Against Allowing Posthumous
DNA Testing
Those opposing post-execution access to DNA evidence may
argue that the need for finality in criminal proceedings counsels
against allowing access to biological evidence after a death sentence
has already been carried out. The perceived need for finality in
death penalty cases has been a recurring concern of Congress and
the federal courts. 310 When Congress passed the AEDPA in 1996, it
significantly limited the number of appeals available to death row
prisoners and set strict time limits on when appeals must be
brought.311 Prior to the passage of the AEDPA, the Supreme Court
306. Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty in 2001: Year End Report, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org, (under What's New/DPIC's 2001 Year End Report (last visited
Feb. 27, 2002) (outlining reform legislation passed in 2001).
307. Id. at 4 (explaining that seventeen states have enacted legislation in 2001 "to provide
inmates with greater opportunity for DNA testing").
308. Id. (noting that, in 2001, some states "made changes in their systems of indigent defense
in an attempt to provide better representation").
309. Berlow, supra note 270, at 78 ("Although the Justice Department and a handful of state
legislatures have examined pieces of the wrongful conviction puzzle, no government agency,
federal or state, has conducted a comprehensive analysis of why such miscarriages occur-not
even in Florida, where at least 18 innocent men have been discovered on death row since 1977.").
310. See infra note 312 and accompanying text. Senator Orrin Hatch, commenting on the
passage of AEDPA, explained that the AEDPA "accomplished a decade-long effort to ensure that
a... capital sentence by a state court could be carried out without awaiting the disruptive, dila-
tory tactics of counsel for condemned prisoners." Deborah L. Stahlkopf, Note, A Dark Day for
Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 1115, 1115 (1998) (citing A Constitutional Amendment for Crime Victims,
1997: Hearing on S.J. Res. 6 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong. (1997), avail-
able at 1997 WL 241160).
311. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), (d) (Supp. V 1999).
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itself took repeated steps to curtail the capital appeals process. 312 In
addition to the specific concern of limiting death penalty appeals,
courts normally refuse to consider any criminal appeal that is
brought after the defendant has died, or after the defendant's sen-
tence has already been completed. 313 Under such circumstances, the
defendant's appeal is generally considered moot. 314
Pointing to these examples of legislative and judicial com-
mitment to finality in criminal proceedings, opponents of post-
execution access to DNA evidence may argue that courts should not
facilitate continued scrutiny of a capital case years after the sen-
tence has already been carried out. Arguing against allowing DNA
testing of biological evidence in the O'Dell case, the Virginia Attor-
ney General's office expressed such a concern for finality, explain-
ing that "Mr. O'Dell had every reasonable opportunity to litigate
and re-litigate and re-re-litigate the question of his innocence ....
At some point in all of these proceedings, Mr. O'Dell has said and
done everything he could have and should have and so have his at-
torneys."315
The doctrines of finality and mootness may well be relevant
in considering whether the family of the executed, representing the
interests of the executed in clearing his name, should be granted
post-execution access to physical evidence in the state's custody.
When bringing a civil suit for access, the family of the executed in
effect brings suit in the name of their loved one, continuing the exe-
cuted's legal challenge to his conviction. Because the suit is argua-
bly brought in the interests of the criminal defendant himself, the
principles of finality and mootness, which restrict the defendant's
own right to challenge his conviction, may similarly restrict his
loved ones' right to challenge the validity of the execution.
In contrast, when third parties, like the media or a public in-
terest group, seek access to the evidence-not in the name of the
executed, but in the name of the public generally-the principles of
finality are not implicated. Such third-party suits are brought to
further the public's right to assess the functioning of government
312. See Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 485, 486 (1995) ("Almost two decades ago the Supreme Court set out to reform habeas cor-
pus. Flying banners of federalism and finality, the Court signaled its intention to impose strict
limitations upon the availability of the writ.").
313. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.5, at 1271-72 (3d ed. 2000).
314. Id.
315. See, e.g., Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 84-85.
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institutions.316 They are not merely a disguised effort to continue
the executed's individual quest for justice.317 Consequently, notions
of finality should not defeat the legitimate access claims of third
parties who truly represent the public interest in monitoring gov-
ernment activity.
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION MANDATING ACCESS TO
DNA EVIDENCE
As discussed in Part II of this Note, parties who have sought
access to DNA evidence through existing legal avenues have met
with limited success. 318 In those cases in which DNA testing has
had the potential to exonerate the executed conclusively, the state
has aggressively opposed access, and the courts have sided with the
state.319 These cases demonstrate that the legal avenues currently
available to those seeking post-execution access to DNA evidence
are insufficient.
Existing legal bases for access are unreliable for two reasons.
First, some legal bases simply do not provide a solid legal founda-
tion upon which to grant access. Under the First Amendment, for
example, press access to information in the government's control is
conditioned upon a historical public right of access to such informa-
tion.320 Since the public has not historically enjoyed access to crimi-
nal evidence in a state's custody, 321 it is difficult to craft a winning
argument for access under the First Amendment. A claim under the
First Amendment will prevail only if a court is willing to entertain
a creative argument that the public's historical access to court
documents encompasses a right to inspect criminal evidence.3 22 Sec-
ond, other legal bases for access afford trial judges enormous dis-
cretion in deciding whether to allow access at all.323 Virginia's Free-
dom of Information Act, for example, provides that the trial judge
316. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text; see also AJC Motion to Intervene, supra
note 54, at 1 (explaining that "The Journal-Constitution... has a right and responsibility to
inspect court records and evidence in order to inform the public about the operation of the crimi-
nal justice system").
317. See id.
318. See supra Part II.
319. See Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 9; Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 91.
320. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1986).
321. See Opinion Letter, supra note 44, at 7.
322. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 130-35 and 214-15 and accompanying text.
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may, in his or her discretion, grant access to evidence. 324 Since
those requesting access to the evidence seek to expose the fallibility
of the court system, it is unlikely that this discretion will often be
exercised to allow access.325
Compelling policy arguments support the right of public and
press access to DNA evidence to assess the reliability of executions.
As discussed in Part III of this Note, permitting access is consistent
with the principles that underlie the freedom of information acts,
the common law right of access, and the First Amendment. These
principles assert that public and press access to information within
the government's control promotes democracy and protects against
government corruption. 326 Proof of a wrongful execution would fur-
ther both of these principles by: (1) fostering a more complete dia-
logue about the appropriateness of retaining capital punishment,
and (2) drawing attention to the patterns of corruption and incom-
petence in the criminal justice system that lead to wrongful convic-
tions and executions.
This Note advocates that legislation be passed to ensure
post-execution access to DNA evidence in a state's custody. Specifi-
cally, a provision that mandates post-execution access to DNA evi-
dence should be added to states' freedom of information acts. The
aim of these provisions would be to provide the media and the gen-
eral public with the means to assess the reliability of questionable
executions.
The legislation requiring post-execution access to DNA evi-
dence should afford little discretion to trial judges. As discussed
earlier in this Note, exposing a wrongful execution would severely
undermine public confidence in the entire criminal justice system,
including the court system. 327 With its own reputation in the bal-
ance, a court given broad discretion over petitions for access simply
cannot be expected to grant access liberally. The statute should
therefore be worded to mandate access in any case in which DNA
testing has the potential to yield exculpatory evidence. The statute
should not require that DNA testing be capable of conclusively ex-
onerating the executed prisoner. In other words, a mere demonstra-
tion that DNA testing could provide any evidence of innocence
should be sufficient to achieve access. By requiring only this very
324. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3706 (Michie 2001) (excluding criminal evidence from the manda-
tory disclosure provisions of the freedom of information act and providing that such evidence
"may be disclosed by the custodian, in his discretion").
325. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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minimal threshold showing, the statute will provide access in cases
like Coleman and O'Dell-where DNA testing of the rape kits could
conclusively exonerate those executed 32 8 -and in Felker and
Jones-where favorable DNA test results could, at best, suggest the
deceased's innocence. 329
While affording the trial court little discretion over whether
to grant access, the legislation should provide courts with the dis-
cretion to shape the terms of access. By dictating the terms of ac-
cess, courts will thus be able to protect the state's interest both in
maintaining the integrity of the evidence and in ensuring reliability
of the testing. In exercising its discretion, a court could, for exam-
ple, require that a neutral, reputable lab conduct the testing, or
that the state retain a portion of the sample. A court should not,
however, be able to categorically deny a request to test evidence
that is in the state's custody, unless the state can demonstrate that
such testing would have no probative value regarding the guilt or
innocence of the deceased.
V. CONCLUSION
The execution of an innocent defendant led to the abolish-
ment of the death penalty in England in 1965.330 More than thirty
years later, Illinois Governor George Ryan imposed a moratorium
on executions after his state came within forty-eight hours of exe-
cuting an innocent man.331 In both cases, the stark illustration of
the risk of executing the innocent transformed the public policy de-
bate over the use of the death penalty.
In the case of Joseph O'Dell, the Virginia Attorney General's
office warned that if DNA tests exonerated O'Dell, it "would be
328. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also Malone, supra note 43 (explaining
that DNA tests in the Jones case might implicate other suspects and corroborate Jones's claim of
innocence).
330. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capi-
tal Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996) (explaining that "executions of innocent defendants,
or of defendants widely believed to be innocent, have played major parts in successful move-
ments to abolish the death penalty, from Michigan in 1846 to England in 1965").
331. Governor Ryan explained, "I cannot support a system which, in its administration, has
proven so fraught with error, and has come so close to the ultimate nightmare, the state's taking
of innocent life." Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Death Penalty: To Err Is Human, NAT'L J., Feb. 12, 2000,
at 450. In his announcement of the moratorium, Governor Ryan specifically referred to the case
of Anthony Porter, an innocent man who spent sixteen years on death row and came within
forty-eight hours of being executed. Alan Berlow, Lethal Injustice, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-Apr.




shouted from the rooftops that the Commonwealth of Virginia exe-
cuted an innocent man."332 This certainly is true. If the Virginia
courts had allowed the third-party plaintiffs to test the evidence,
and the tests had exonerated O'Dell, the media would have widely
broadcast the news that the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the
name of all of its citizens, had executed an innocent man.
But, rather than fearing the potential exposure of the sys-
tem's fallibility, we should welcome the opportunity to examine any
shortcomings of the capital punishment system. If, in fact, innocent
people have been executed in recent history, the public benefits
from discovering such occurrences and implementing the reforms
necessary to prevent future tragedies.
Anne-Marie Moyes*
332. Record of Fruit Hearing, supra note 17, at 82.
* This Note is dedicated to Erskine Johnson and the hundreds of other innocent people in
U.S. prisons for whom DNA offers no hope of liberation. For such individuals, whose cases lack
any biological evidence, the road to exoneration is long and exceptionally difficult.
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